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Abstract
The Finnish economy posted GDP growth of 0.5% in 2015, after three years of recession. In early 2015 the 
main drivers of slow growth were exports and consumption, towards the end of the year the principal driver 
was investment.
In 2016 the Finnish economy is expected to grow by 0.9% from last year.
The growth outlook for the global economy and trade is modest. World trade will increase by 3% in 2016, 
accelerating only slightly to 5% in 2018. The performance of exports will remain weaker than global trade, 
and therefore Finland will continue to lose market shares. Lower energy prices, and oil prices in particular, 
are bolstering the growth prospects of energy-intensive economies such as Finland. The sharpest falls in 
energy and raw material prices have bottomed out, and the price of oil will start to move moderately higher. 
In 2017 consumer prices will accelerate to 1.3%. Nominal earnings will rise annually by around one per cent 
over the outlook period. Assuming that these projections are accurate, Finnish competitiveness will improve 
in comparison with Sweden and Germany, for instance.  
Investment will return to clear growth in 2016 and continue to grow on a broad base throughout the out-
look period. Private consumption growth will be supported this year by moderate price trends. In 2017–2018 
consumption growth will continue to outpace real income growth on the back on strengthening consumer 
confidence. Projections for 2017 and 2018 forecast muted GDP growth at 1.2%. During the forecast horizon 
the Finnish economy will grow slightly faster than potential output, and therefore the negative output gap 
will shrink.
The number of persons employed will turn to growth of 0.3% in 2016 as the economy continues to 
rebound. Employment will improve throughout the outlook period, and the unemployment rate will drop 
back to 8.7% by 2018.   
Finnish public finances have been running a deficit since 2009. The general government budgetary posi-
tion will improve in the years ahead in response to fiscal adjustment and rebounding economic growth, but 
nonetheless remain in deficit. General government debt to GDP has long been rising, and the same trend is 
set to continue. Finland’s budgetary deficit came within the 3% of GDP target as set out in the EU Treaty, but 
public debt remains in breach of the 60% limit.
Central government has the largest deficit of all general government sectors, although its deficit is shrink-
ing. Local government finances will also remain firmly in deficit, and other social security funds are gradually 
moving back to balance. Earnings-related pension institutions are running a deficit of around 1% of GDP.

Preface
The Spring 2016 Economic Survey is prepared as background material for the Govern-
ment’s spending limits decision. It offers projections of Finland’s economic outlook for 
2016–2018. In addition to short-term prospects, the Economic Survey includes medium-
term projections extending to 2020.
The forecast and trend projections in the survey are prepared independently by the Min-
istry of Finance Economics Department based on the Act on the implementation of the 
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union 
and on multi-annual budgetary frameworks (869/2012).
The forecasts are based on provisional national accounts data for 2015 published by Sta-
tistics Finland in March 2016 and on other public statistical sources available on 22 March 
2016. Both the short-term and medium-term projections take account of the decisions taken 
by the Government in its spending limits discussions on 5 May 2016.
Helsinki April 2016
Ministry of Finance Economics Department
Markus Sovala
Director general
Mika Kuismanen  Mikko Spolander  
Director  Director
Forecasting unit  Stability unit
    (Public finances)
The source for all data on materialised developments is Statistics Finland unless otherwise indicated. 
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Summary
Economic outlook 2015-2017
After three years of recession, Finland returned to GDP growth of 0.5% in 2015, accord-
ing to provisional Statistics Finland figures. In early 2015 the main drivers of this slow 
growth were exports and consumption, towards the end of the year the principal driver 
was investment.
In 2016 the Finnish economy is forecast to post growth of 0.9% from last year. Projec-
tions for 2017 and 2018 forecast muted growth at 1.2%. The forecasts do not factor in the 
effects of a possible social contract.
Despite the slight rebound, the Finnish economy is expected to remain weak in the 
immediate future. It is predicted that GDP in 2018 will still be some 2% lower than in 2008, 
and that industrial output in 2018 will be about one-fifth lower than 10 years ago. The per-
formance of exports will remain weaker than global trade, and therefore Finland will con-
tinue to lose market shares in world trade.
In the immediate future economic activity will be maintained primarily by private con-
sumption and investment. In the medium term potential output growth, which reflects the 
level of output possible given the resources on hand, will be less than one per cent.
The growth outlook for the global economy and trade is modest. World trade will 
increase by 3% in 2016, accelerating only slightly to 5% in 2018. In 2018 world economic 
growth will reach no more than around 4%. Growth prospects in China have continued to 
deteriorate, and the growth rate is forecast to drop back to 6%. Recently much concern has 
been expressed about the Chinese stock market, but we should not to read too much into 
its performance: the stock market structure and operation differ significantly from those 
of its western counterparts and do not reflect developments in the real economy in the 
same way. The slowdown of economic growth in China is clearly reflected in the outlook of 
other emerging economies, which will be heavily hit by the reduced Chinese demand for 
raw materials. The Russian economy is continuing to contract, and there is no growth in 
sight in 2017. Russian imports are continuing to fall, and the country’s growth potential is 
hampered by the rigidities of its economic system.  
It is expected that many of Finland’s major trade partners will see rather solid economic 
development. US economic growth has not reached the levels predicted earlier, but the pros-
pects for growth are still good: over the next few years the economy will post growth of 
around 2.5%. The Swedish economy showed very strong growth last year at 4.5%. This will 
slow down over the next couple of years, but growth will nonetheless remain broad-based 
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and faster than in the EU area on average. In the UK, too, growth is broad-based and the 
economic situation is expected to remain strong throughout the forecast horizon. In Ger-
many, growth will reach a healthy 1.5%. The euro area is also back on a track of moderate 
growth, and the annual growth forecast for the outlook period is around 2%.
The monetary policies pursued by central banks are growth-supportive. The ECB has 
further expanded its exceptional monetary policy operations, and its reference rates will 
remain at historically low levels throughout the outlook period. Short-term interest rates 
will remain negative in 2017, and the three-month Euribor interest rate will only move into 
marginally positive territory in 2018. The ten-year interest rate will also remain low, aver-
aging 1.6% in the last year of the forecast horizon.
There is downward pressure on the euro to dollar exchange rate, and the forecast is that 
by 2018 the euro will be at parity with the dollar. The weakening of the euro will bolster the 
price competitiveness of exports in markets where payments are settled in dollars. Around 
80% of Finnish exports are invoiced in euros or dollars. Lower energy prices, and oil prices 
in particular, are good news for the growth prospects of energy-intensive economies such 
as Finland. The sharpest falls in energy and raw material prices have bottomed out, and the 
price of oil will start to move moderately higher.
The development of earnings is a major domestic cost factor with important implica-
tions for competitiveness. Nominal earnings will rise annually by around one per cent over 
the outlook period. Assuming that these projections are accurate, Finnish competitiveness 
will improve in comparison with Sweden and Germany, for instance.   
The Finnish GDP growth forecast for 2016 is 0.9%. This moderate growth will mainly be 
driven by investment. It is predicted that private investment will increase by 5.8%. Invest-
ment growth will be broad-based, but particularly strong in building construction. The 
growth of investment in machinery and equipment is particularly positive, even though 
most of it is attributable to a few major projects. 
In 2016 household real disposable income growth will pick up and private consump-
tion will increase by one per cent. The growth of consumer demand will be focused on 
spending on durables. Household indebtedness will continue to increase, but at a slower 
rate than earlier. 
With imports growth outpacing exports growth, net exports will have a negative effect on 
economic growth. Imports will be driven by increasing investment and consumer demand. 
It is predicted that exports will rise by no more than 1.3%, and therefore Finland will con-
tinue to lose market shares in world trade. It is predicted that the current account will be 
close to balance.
The slide in industrial output is finally coming to a halt after five consecutive years 
of decline. It is forecast that industrial production will increase by 0.8% in 2016. Service 
production is also set to grow by almost one per cent. The number of persons employed is 
expected to be 0.3% higher than the year before, and the annual average unemployment 
rate is predicted to come in at 9.3%. The biggest problem in the labour market is the sharp 
rise in long-term and structural unemployment. Consumer prices are expected to rise mod-
erately in 2016 by just 0.3%.
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The GDP growth forecast for 2017 is 1.2%. This growth will again mainly be driven by 
investment and private consumption. Exports will begin to pick up in the wake of rebound-
ing world trade, but the growth rate will remain historically subdued. Imports will margin-
ally outpace exports, but the negative growth contribution of net exports will be smaller 
than the year before. Investment growth will slow somewhat from the current year, but all 
investment items will nonetheless continue to post positive growth.
Private consumption volume growth will slow somewhat, but still remain relatively 
strong compared with disposable income growth. The forecast for private consumption 
growth is based on the assumption of improving consumer confidence, which will contrib-
ute to reduce the household savings rate. It is predicted that industrial output will increase 
by some 2%, mainly on the back of strong metal industry performance. The 2% figure for 
output growth is  still very modest indeed. No significant improvement is predicted in the 
labour market situation. The number of employed persons will increase by 0.4%, and the 
unemployment rate is expected to fall to 9%. Consumer prices will accelerate to 1.3%.
The GDP growth forecast for the last year of the forecast horizon is 1.2%. Overall, the 
growth outlook for the 2016–2018 period is quite subdued. Ultimately the reason for this 
lies in the persistently sluggish performance of exports. In the short term domestic demand 
will continue to drive economic growth, but for a small open economy like Finland this is 
not enough to generate faster than projected growth. From the point of view of economic 
welfare and its underlying international division of labour, it is crucial that the country also 
has a competitive export sector.
Projected cumulative growth in 2016–2018 will reach no more than 3.3%, and the GDP 
volume will remain lower than in 2008. The Finnish economy is in poor shape and faces 
huge challenges. During the forecast horizon the Finnish economy will grow slightly faster 
than potential output, and therefore the negative output gap will shrink.
Finnish public finances have been running a deficit since 2009. The general govern-
ment budgetary position will improve in the years ahead in response to fiscal adjustment 
and rebounding economic growth, but nonetheless remain in deficit. General government 
debt to GDP has long been rising, and the same trend is set to continue. Finland’s budget-
ary deficit came within the 3% of GDP target as set out in the EU Treaty, but public debt 
will continue to exceed the 60% limit.
Central government has the largest deficit of all general government sectors, although 
its deficit is shrinking. Local government finances will also remain firmly in deficit, and 
other social security funds are gradually moving back to balance. Earnings-related pension 
institutions are running a deficit of around 1% of GDP.  
The risks of the forecast for the international economy are skewed to the downside. In 
China, indebtedness has continued to grow rapidly, especially in the private sector. In the 
longer term it is also unclear how successful China will be in reforming its economic model 
and placing greater weight on domestic consumption and services at the expense of manu-
facturing, investment and exports. The Chinese slowdown and restructuring may also cause 
greater than anticipated problems especially for emerging economies. In the euro area, too, the 
risks remain skewed to the downside. Russia’s economic situation remains precarious. Political 
tensions are fuelling high levels of uncertainty and may further deepen the recession in Russia.
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It is thought that the sense of uncertainty will also continue in the financial market. 
Stock prices have fluctuated widely since the beginning of the year, and prices of banking 
shares in particular have fallen. The situation in the Italian and to some extent in the Ger-
man banking sector is causing concern, and there is an apparent risk of contagion. It is 
impossible to offer an overall assessment of the consequences of an unconventional fiscal 
policy. In any event low interest rates in the current environment of light fiscal policy have 
fuelled a search-for-yield mentality, and investment flows have been channelled into the 
housing and stock market, partly as a result of the low demand for credit. Prices have risen 
sharply in the markets, increasing the risk of major corrective movements.
The domestic risks are still predominantly related to the development of the real econ-
omy and the labour market. The Finnish economy has shown poor performance in recent 
years, and over the next couple of years economic growth will remain slower than in com-
petitor countries. Finnish competitiveness is still weaker than in those countries, and Fin-
land will continue to lose market shares in global trade.
The lesson learned from the past few years is that the health of the national economy 
can only be properly restored under conditions of a strong real economy. If the Finnish 
economy develops as predicted, this will not be enough to essentially improve the state of 
public finances, for instance. 
Priority focus should now be given to developing economic policy reforms that have 
genuine impact on household and business behaviour. The situation in the Finnish labour 
market looks less than promising. The proportion of the inactive population is too high, and 
the supply and demand match in the labour market needs improving. Decisions on business 
location and production activities are influenced by input price levels and their development. 
In a competitive marketplace these factors will have an increasingly pronounced influence.
The best way to tackle the challenges facing the economy is by means of a predictable 
economic policy and a proactive approach to addressing structural problems. The develop-
ment of the Finnish economy and the Government’s economic policy decisions are currently 
being closely monitored both inside and outside the country. The impressions of outside 
observers will for their own part influence the future course of the economy.
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Table 1. Key forecast figures 
2015
EUR 
bn
2013 2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018**
change in volume, %
GDP at market prices 207 -0.8 -0.7 0.5 0.9 1.2 1.2 
Imports 77 0.5 0.0 -0.4 2.6 3.0 3.5 
Total supply 284 -0.8 -0.3 0.0 1.4 1.6 1.8 
Exports 77 1.1 -0.9 0.6 1.3 2.9 3.6 
Consumption 167 0.0 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 
private 116 -0.5 0.6 1.4 1.0 0.8 0.9 
public 51 1.1 -0.3 -0.9 -0.1 0.0 0.0 
Investment 42 -4.9 -2.6 -1.1 5.2 3.3 3.0 
private 34 -6.6 -3.1 -1.0 5.8 4.1 4.0 
public 8 2.6 -0.6 -1.2 2.7 0.1 -1.3 
Total demand 285 -0.4 -0.1 -0.4 0.8 1.1 1.3 
domestic demand 207 -1.1 0.2 -0.7 0.6 0.4 0.4 
2013 2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018**
GDP, EUR bn 203 205 207 211 215 221
Services, change in volume, % -1.4 -0.2 0.9 0.7 1.2 1.0 
Industry, change in volume, % 0.0 -1.7 -0.6 0.8 2.1 2.4 
Labour productivity, change, % 0.5 0.0 0.7 0.4 1.0 1.0 
Employed labour force, change, % -1.0 -0.4 -0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 
Employment rate, % 68.5 68.3 68.1 68.4 68.8 69.1 
Unemployment rate, % 8.2 8.7 9.4 9.3 9.0 8.7 
Consumer price index, change, % 1.5 1.0 -0.2 0.3 1.3 1.5 
Index of wage and salary earnings, change, % 2.1 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.2 
Current account, EUR bn -3.3 -1.9 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.6 
Current account, relative to GDP, % -1.6 -0.9 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 
Short-term interest rates (3-month Euribor), % 0.2 0.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 
Long-term interest rates (10-year govt. bonds), % 1.9 1.4 0.7 0.6 1.1 1.6 
General government expenditure, relative to GDP, % 57.5 58.1 58.3 58.2 57.6 57.0 
Tax ratio, relative to GDP, % 43.7 43.9 44.5 44.6 44.4 44.1 
General government net lending, relative to GDP, % -2.6 -3.2 -2.7 -2.5 -2.1 -1.8 
Central government net lending, relative to GDP, % -3.7 -3.8 -3.1 -2.9 -2.6 -2.2 
General government gross debt, relative to GDP, % 55.4 59.3 63.1 65.0 66.7 67.4 
Central government debt, relative to GDP, % 44.1 46.3 48.2 50.0 51.6 52.4 
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Calculating the effects of reducing business operating costs
The MoF Economics Department has assessed the impact of a temporary reduction in busi-
ness operating costs on the broader development of the economy using its macroeconomic 
model (Kooma). The analysis is conducted for the 2016–2021 period. The results are reported 
in relation to the steady state path, which may be represented by the current outlook for the 
Finnish economy.
Operating costs are crucial to the potential of businesses to generate output and emplo-
yment. Lower costs can pave the way to improved price competitiveness. Investment in intel-
lectual capital, new products and new procedures and practices all contribute to improve busi-
ness productivity and to reduce marginal costs (the cost that results when output changes by 
one unit). Longer working hours also reduce businesses’ marginal costs.
The calculation compares two different types of shocks that lower businesses’ marginal 
costs. The overall productivity shock gives businesses access to better technology and increa-
ses the volume of output. The labour supply shock primarily increases the number of hours 
worked; the number of jobs only increases later in response to increased output levels. The 
labour supply shock is derived from the household benefit function. A positive labour supply 
shock reduces the marginal rate of substitution in consumption relative to employment and 
creates an incentive to work more. Both shocks are temporary quarterly impulses, and both 
return equally quickly to the baseline.
The productivity shock will lower the marginal costs of domestic production, and busines-
ses will gradually re-price their products (see Figure 1 TFP). The lowered price level will boost 
exports. Exports will peak one year later when export companies have re-priced their products 
and when improved price competitiveness has bolstered exports. The demand for labour input 
and wages will fall as increased productivity will reduce the amount of labour input needed to 
generate the same amount of output. There will be a temporary decrease in consumption as 
liquidity-strapped consumers immediately cut back on their spending. Consumers who opti-
mise over time, in contrast, will increase their consumption with falling price levels. Consump-
tion will return to positive growth within one year, and the overall cumulative effect is distinctly 
positive. Exports will drive output to growth, and employment will begin to improve.
The labour supply shock will increase the willingness to work, and the number of hours wor-
ked will increase (see Figure 1 Employment). Costs per output unit, i.e. marginal costs will there-
fore be reduced. As in the case of the productivity shock, reduced marginal costs will contribute 
to boost exports through more competitively priced products. The increased supply of labour 
will also have the effect of lowering wages. The wage reaction obviously has a major impact on 
the outcome. The less wage adjustment there is, the less will be the cumulative effects of redu-
ced costs, and the less prices will fall and exports improve. On the other hand, consumption 
will also decrease less. The difference will be greatest in the case of liquidity-strapped consu-
mers, who will respond more immediately to changes in their wages. The impacts of the wage 
reaction are also felt at the level of output. The sharper the slowdown in wages in comparison 
with steady state growth, the more output and overall employment will improve and the lon-
ger lasting this improvement.
The public sector deficit will show a temporary marginal increase, but overall the deficit will 
shrink. In other words, steps to create more favourable conditions for business through lowe-
red costs will also benefit public finances.
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Medium-term outlook
Finland’s GDP returned to slight growth last year, after three consecutive years of decline. 
Apart from cyclical factors, the poor performance of the economy is due to an ongoing 
process of restructuring in industry and the economy as a whole, which has also under-
mined longer term growth prospects. It is expected that economic growth will slightly 
accelerate this year and next. However it is thought that growth will remain historically 
slow even in the medium term.
The medium-term outlook can be examined via potential output, which is thought to 
determine the economy’s medium-term growth prospects. In its assessments of potential 
output the MoF Economics Department uses the production function method as devel-
oped jointly by the EU Commission and Member States, in which potential output growth 
is divided between projections of potential labour input, capital and total factor produc-
tivity. Potential output is an unobservable variable and its assessment is highly challeng-
ing, especially during a strong economic cycle and under conditions of rapid changes in 
the production structure.
The labour input will decrease over the next years as the population of working age 
continues to shrink. At the same time, though, labour participation rates are expected to 
increase somewhat, especially in older age groups. Another factor determining labour input 
growth is the structural unemployment rate: this is the level of unemployment below which 
upward wage pressures begin to develop in the labour market. In practice this means that 
unemployment is above its structural level when real unit labour costs are falling, i.e. when 
wages are rising more slowly than productivity and inflation taken together. Using the EU’s 
common method, it is estimated that Finland’s structural unemployment level is around 
8%. The medium-term forecast is that unemployment will begin to approximate this level 
as the output gap closes. The declining labour input will weaken potential output growth 
to some extent in the medium term.
Increasing total factor productivity has been a major driver of economic growth in the 
past few decades. In recent years, however, total factor productivity has shown only modest 
growth. This slowdown is attributable to both cyclical and structural factors. Output has 
dropped significantly in high-productivity branches, and at the same time services have 
gained increasing prominence in the economy. The total factor productivity trend can be 
extracted from observed productivity based on the capacity utilisation rate and other cycli-
cal indicators. In recent years total factor productivity trend growth has been around zero, 
and it is expected that in the medium term the growth rate will remain much slower than 
in the early 2000s.
The economy’s potential output is dependent not only on labour input and total factor 
productivity, but also on the existing capital stock. Several years of low investment have 
contributed to slow capital stock growth and therefore undermined the economy’s future 
growth potential. An increased investment rate over the outlook period will strengthen the 
economy’s growth potential. Overall it is projected that the economy’s growth potential will 
only rise to just under one per cent a year by 2020.
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The difference between total actual output and potential output, i.e. the output gap is 
negative when actual output is lower than potential output. This means there is idle capac-
ity in the economy and output can grow more rapidly than potential output without cre-
ating price pressures. It is estimated that in 2016 the output gap will stand at around 2% 
of potential output. In 2016–2020, it is predicted that the economy will grow at an average 
annual rate of just over one per cent. According to the EU’s common production function 
method, Finland’s potential output growth is slower, on average just over ½% a year. When 
GDP growth exceeds its potential, the output gap contracts, and according to the forecast 
the output gap will close in 2020. When the output gap closes, unemployment will approach 
its structural level, the labour participation rate will be at its trend level and total factor 
productivity growth will be equivalent to trend growth once all idle production capacity 
has been put to use.
Finnish public finances have been running a significant deficit since 2009. Although eco-
nomic growth is rebounding and the output gap is contracting, this growth is not enough 
to bridge the deficit in public finances. At the same time, population ageing is continuing 
to weigh down on public finances. General government revenue is no longer enough to sus-
tain all the structures and functions of the public sector that were created on the founda-
tions of stronger economic growth.
Slow potential output growth is having an adverse effect on public finances as economic 
growth and therefore tax revenue growth are expected to remain subdued in the years ahead. 
Despite fiscal adjustment, public finances will remain in structural deficit. The public debt 
to GDP ratio exceeded the 60% threshold in 2015, but fiscal consolidation will contribute 
to slow the growth of the debt ratio during the next years.
Table 2. Key forecast figures for the medium term
2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018** 2019** 2020**
GDP at market prices, change in volume, % -0.7 0.5 0.9 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1
Consumer price index, change, % 1.0 -0.2 0.3 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.8
Unemployment, % 8.7 9.4 9.3 9.0 8.7 8.4 8.1
Employment rate, % 68.3 68.1 68.4 68.8 69.1 69.4 69.7
General government net lending, % of GDP -3.2 -2.7 -2.5 -2.1 -1.8 -1.4 -1.3
Central government -3.8 -3.1 -2.9 -2.6 -2.2 -1.7 -1.5
Local government -0.8 -0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8
Social security funds 1.3 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.9
Structural balance, % of GDP -1.5 -1.3 -1.5 -1.4 -1.4 -1.2 -1.3
General government gross debt,  % of GDP 59.3 63.1 65.0 66.7 67.4 67.4 67.2
Central government debt, % of GDP 46.3 48.2 50.0 51.6 52.4 52.6 52.5
Output gap, % of potential output  1) -3.0 -2.5 -1.9 -1.2 -0.7 -0.4 0.0
1)  Estimated according the method developed jointly by the EU Commission and Member States.
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Fiscal policy
General government expenditure is financed from revenue generated by economic activ-
ity. Households and businesses pay taxes on their incomes, and households furthermore 
on their consumption. In addition, public ownerships generate property income. For this 
reason slow economic growth presents a major challenge for Finnish public finances.
The Finnish economy has been in  a difficult situation for the past few years, often record-
ing negative GDP growth figures. Unemployment has increased, and unemployment spells 
have become longer. The downturn has been longer and deeper than anticipated.
At the same time, the prospects for economic growth have been eroded by industrial 
restructuring, low investment, the prolonged  unemployment becoming structural and 
population ageing.
Demographic change will continue apace for the most part of the next two decades. 
During this period the main factor driving aggregate economic output growth will be total 
factor productivity. On this basis it is estimated that the potential for growth will be around 
1–1.5% over the long term.
Public finances have been significantly impacted by the challenging times. The general 
government budgetary position has deteriorated, and the debt ratio has increased rapidly. 
In 2014, the general government deficit was over 3% of GDP. The deficit decreased in 2015, 
but the debt ratio exceeded 60% of GDP.
As the economic downturn recedes, the general government budgetary position will 
gradually improve. The steps taken by the Government to stabilise public finances will also 
contribute to strengthen the budgetary position. Nonetheless public finances are faced with 
the risk of persistent structural imbalance. The foreseeable economic growth will not be 
enough to finance existing public structures nor to guarantee the long-term provision of 
statutory benefits and public services.
In this situation it is important that fiscal and other economic policy is geared to strik-
ing a balance between supporting domestic demand through the recession, curbing the 
growth of public debt in the medium term, improving the conditions for economic growth 
and ensuring the sustainability of public finances in the long term.
In order to make informed and appropriate economic policy decisions, it is crucial to 
have a clear understanding of the factors contributing to the poor performance of the econ-
omy. In Finland, most of these factors are structural by nature.
Steps to support domestic demand will not help to solve problems that are caused by shift-
ing economic structures. Fiscal measures aimed at boosting demand make sense if they also 
promote economic restructuring and the conditions for future output. Sustainable growth 
can only be generated through innovations and productivity growth in business firms.
The strong and stable institutions of Finnish society, including health care, education, 
public social insurance, the banking and financial system as well as our euro zone mem-
bership all contribute to enhance households’ and businesses’ risk tolerance. These institu-
tions provide a sound basis for innovations and productivity growth.
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The key areas of economic policy focus for Prime Minister Juha Sipilä’s Government are 
competitiveness, employment and public service provision. The Government’s economic 
policy  objectives are to curb the growth of public debt and to bridge the sustainability gap 
by means of savings as well as measures that support growth and improve the efficiency of 
public service provision.
The Government’s immediate fiscal adjustment package to strengthen public finances 
consists of actions aimed at curbing public expenditure and reallocating expenditure. The 
net effect of these actions will improve the general government budgetary position by some 
EUR 4 billion by 2019. With the decisions announced by the Government on 5 April 2016, 
the planned package of actions has almost reached its full extent. The actions will be imple-
mented as per the schedules set out in connection with annual state budgets.
The Government is committed to improve the conditions for employment and eco-
nomic growth by means of taxation and by strengthening competitiveness and produc-
tivity growth. Central to these efforts will be moderate wage settlements, the introduc-
tion of an export industry driven approach to wage formation, and labour market reforms 
designed to encourage local level wage bargaining. The target has been to generate enough 
new growth and jobs to improve the general government budgetary position by EUR 1–1.5 
billion over the medium term.
Key longer-term measures are those designed to cut public sector costs by easing munic-
ipalities’ burden of statutory duties and obligations, by taking better advantage of digitali-
sation, and by restructuring social welfare and health care services and funding, including 
the reform of regional and central administration. These reforms are now in the planning 
stage and are proceeding on schedule. By means of these actions, the Government’s aim is 
to curb public expenditure growth by some EUR 4 billion over the long term.
Furthermore, Parliament has adopted the pension reform initiated by the previous gov-
ernment. This reform will enter into force from the beginning of 2017 and will contribute 
to strengthen public finances in the long term.
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1 Economic outlook
1.1 Global economy 
World economic growth remains slow
The outlook for the world economy is multifaceted. The global picture is one of accelerat-
ing growth, but there is marked variation in economic conditions and future prospects. 
In advanced economies, growth is slowly picking up, but the outlook for many emerging 
economies is challenging. The Chinese economy is set to slow after a sustained period of 
robust growth, and Russia and Brazil will remain in recession for at least the current year. 
The slowdown of growth and restructuring in China are overshadowing the prospects of 
many emerging economies and raw material producers, especially in Asia, Oceania and 
the Middle East, but growth in India will remain strong.
The euro area has remained on a slow growth track, partly as a result of reduced prices of 
oil and many other imports and a weaker euro exchange rate. These tailwinds will dissipate by 
the end of the outlook period. The supply of credit and overall financing conditions have also 
improved, fiscal policy is hampering growth to a lesser extent than before, and monetary pol-
icy remains expansionary. These factors are contributing to drive private consumer demand, 
and investment is also slowly rebounding. The exceptionally high level of immigration will 
provide a minor additional demand boost, but adversely affect the balance of public finances.
In Spain, Ireland and elsewhere, earlier structural reforms have contributed to a return 
to brisk growth. Euro area growth is still hampered by persistently high unemployment. In 
the UK and Sweden, growth is still robust and employment is at a high level.
Broad-based, but slower than anticipated growth is continuing in the United States. The 
rebound is supported not only by low energy prices, but also by stronger household balance 
sheets, favourable labour market conditions and a lighter fiscal policy. The rate of new job crea-
tion is higher than the rates of resignation and recruitment. Both nominal and real wages are 
rising faster than ever since the financial crisis, and consumer confidence has returned to its 
historical median. Investment is also set to grow at a moderate rate. The dollar has strengthened 
with interest hike expectations, which will contribute to slow exports and increase imports.
Productivity growth has slowed both in Europe and the United States, hampering 
prospects for supply growth. Productivity growth has remained strong at the technologi-
cal forefront, but slowed significantly elsewhere. Productivity is set to play an increasingly 
significant role in the future, especially in the ageing European labour market. Structural 
reforms could help to improve the conditions for productivity growth.
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The Russian economy continues to remain dependent on oil and gas exports. The coun-
try has failed to transform itself or to use the revenue generated from raw materials to diver-
sify its production. Its growth potential is effectively hampered by unmade investments and 
obsolete economic structures, such as public interference in private sector investment and 
production decisions. Post-recession growth in Russia will remain very muted.
In China, growth in industry, construction and commodity exports has already slowed 
significantly, and this trend is set to continue. The Chinese economy is now in transition from 
an export and investment driven model to one led by domestic consumption and services. 
Historically, corresponding changes have resulted in a marked slowdown of growth. If the 
country is successful in its policy, this slowdown will be well controlled, initially to around 6%.
Japan’s growth potential is less than 1%, and even minor negative shocks can push the 
economy into technical recession. Japanese exports have failed to recover despite persis-
tent stimulus and a massive devaluation of the yen. Although the population is ageing rap-
idly, the supply of labour has remained strong. The labour market remains tight, and rising 
wages over the outlook period will support household demand.
World trade to remain modest
World trade growth has slowed, among other reasons because of the slowdown of Chinese 
manufacturing and sluggish investment activity in industrial countries. Imports growth 
will remain exceptionally modest, especially in emerging economies. Before the financial 
crisis, trade growth was around twice as high as output growth, but at the moment trade 
is actually growing more slowly than output. Earlier, such slow rates of trade growth have 
only been seen under conditions of recession.
Finland’s market share in world trade has continued to shrink, but this trend is now 
slowing. In the euro area, Finland has almost regained the same market share as it had 
before the crisis. In Sweden and Russia, on the other hand, Finland is continuing to lose 
market shares. Global trade will not provide a strong demand impetus for Finnish exports.
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Inflation set to remain very moderate
The price of crude oil has fallen sharply above all in response to the deteriorating outlook 
in emerging economies and persistently high US and OPEC supply. The supply of crude oil 
will expand further following the agreement reached in the Iranian nuclear dispute, and 
oil prices will rise only very moderately. As energy is an intermediate input in all products 
and services, the effects of the oil price shock will be felt throughout the economy.
Slower than expected growth of demand from emerging economies and continued high 
supply have caused other industrial raw material prices to fall sharply, too. Raw material 
prices are apparently reaching a bottom. Furthermore, the slide in producer prices due to 
excess capacity in China has continued. Together, these factors have thrown world export 
prices into sharp decline. Inflation expectations are also extremely low, allowing central 
banks in industrial countries to persist with the current unusual monetary policy stance. 
However there is no real threat of a deflationary cycle in sight.
In the United States, interest rates have begun slowly to move back to normal. Interest 
rates in the euro area will rise very slowly over the outlook period and for a long time remain 
at a clearly lower level than was normally seen during the pre-crisis period.
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Risks remain on the downside
In China, indebtedness has continued to grow rapidly, especially in the private sector. The 
high and increasing debt burden coupled with slowing growth and economic restructuring 
may cause shocks that, because of the size of the Chinese market and global value chains, 
may have wide-ranging effects, particularly on raw materials and investment goods sup-
pliers. In the longer term it is also unclear how successful China will be in reforming its 
economic model and placing greater weight on domestic consumption and services at the 
expense of manufacturing, investment and exports. The Chinese slowdown and restructur-
ing may also cause greater than anticipated problems especially for emerging economies.
In the euro area, too, the risks remain skewed to the downside. Households may strug-
gle even more than anticipated to recover with the waning effects of the current favour-
able conditions. It is also unclear how committed indebted member states are to the politi-
cally-charged programmes of public sector adjustment, and adjustment may have the effect 
of reducing demand more than anticipated. The ability of the euro area to resist negative 
shocks will remain weak.
The outlook remains overshadowed by geopolitical tensions in Ukraine, the Middle 
East and elsewhere. Confidence has not weakened to the same extent as in many earlier 
political and currency crises, but if tensions flare both trade flows and financing may be 
adversely affected.
Russia’s economic situation remains precarious. Political tensions are fuelling high lev-
els of uncertainty and may further deepen the recession in Russia. It is unclear how the 
country will adapt to the period of slow growth that lies ahead. 
Extremely low interest rates in industrial countries and a stronger search-for-yield men-
tality have steered investment flows into the housing and stock market, which may have 
led to overvaluations. In Sweden, for instance, housing prices have risen very sharply. The 
winding down of unconventional monetary policy, the edging up of interest rates and the 
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strengthening of the US dollar may cause strong reactions in the financial market. Many 
emerging economies in particular may see more strong movements of capital as they have 
taken out large amounts of dollar-denominated loans.
Other upside risks are that lower oil prices may strengthen demand from oil-importing 
countries more than anticipated, or productivity may recover to stronger growth.
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Table 3. Gross domestic product
2013 2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018**
change in volume, % 
World (PPP) 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.4 3.9 4.1 
Euro area -0.5 1.0 1.8 2.0 2.0 2.0 
EU 1.0 1.4 1.6 2.2 2.2 2.1 
Germany 0.4 1.6 1.4 1.7 1.5 1.5 
France 0.7 0.2 1.4 1.2 1.7 1.5 
Sweden 1.6 2.0 4.5 3.2 2.5 2.2 
United Kingdom 1.7 3.0 1.9 2.7 2.5 2.2 
United States 1.5 2.4 1.9 2.7 2.5 2.2 
Japan 1.6 -0.1 0.7 1.0 0.7 0.7 
China 7.8 7.3 6.8 6.5 6.2 6.0 
Russia 1.2 0.6 -3.7 -2.0 0.0 1.0 
Sources: Eurostat, statistical authorities, IMF, MoF 
Table 4. Background assumptions
2013 2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018**
World trade growth, % 2.6 3.3 2.8 3.0 4.2 5.0 
EUR/USD 1.33 1.33 1.11 1.08 1.05 1.02 
Industrial raw material price index, EA,  
€ (2010=100) 91.0 90.0 84.0 75 75 75
Crude oil (Brent), €/barrel 82.0 74.5 47.8 34.3 39 44
3-month Euribor, % 0.2 0.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 
Government bonds (10-year), % 1.9 1.4 0.7 0.6 1.1 1.6 
Export market share (2000=100) 1) 84 81 79 78 77 76
Import prices, % -1.7 -1.6 -3.2 -1.2 1.2 1.4 
1)  Ratio of export growth to world trade growth
Sources: Statistical authorities, CPB, HWWI, Reuters, MoF 
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Euro area moves towards stability – but the threats remain 
Financial stability has increased in the euro area as Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Cyprus have 
persevered with rigorous fiscal adjustment and turned their economies back to growth, res-
tored balance in public finances and regained competitiveness in the global marketplace. The 
easing of the Greek situation in the autumn, following the crisis last summer, has also had a 
beneficial impact. At the same time, several euro countries have had success in strengthening 
their banking sectors. It is paramount, though, that reforms are continued in all euro countries 
to generate economic growth. A highly indebted economy has limited fiscal room to maneuver 
and therefore limited capacity to absorb new external shocks.
Profitability in the banking sector is weighed down by the deteriorating international economic 
outlook and persistently low interest rates. In the euro area the Portuguese and Italian banking 
sectors in particular have been overshadowed by uncertainty, and public intervention has been 
required to invigorate the banking systems. The volume of non-performing loans in the Italian 
banking system is relatively high. At the same time, the Italian state is carrying a heavy debt bur-
den, and growth prospects are moderate. Italian banks hold a significant share of Italian govern-
ment bonds, so any deterioration in the situation of these banks could compromise their ability 
to renew their holdings of those bonds. This would impact interest rates on Italian sovereign debt.
For continued financial stability it is important that there is ongoing political commitment to 
reform in all programme countries. Portugal’s budgetary position has deteriorated in the wake 
of the country’s elections and increasing uncertainty about the commitment to reform and the 
state of public finances. It is crucial that the sense of political limbo following the parliamentary 
elections in Spain and Ireland can be resolved within the next few months. Continued political 
stability is a key factor in Greece as well.
Greek economic recovery essential
With Cyprus completing its own programme in March 2016, Greece is now the only remaining 
euro area economy with an ongoing economic adjustment programme. The recent Greek crisis led 
to an agreement on a new bailout deal under the European Stability Mechanism ESM in August 
2015. Greece had slipped into a state of acute financial crisis, and it was at risk of insolvency. The 
flight of deposits that threatened the stability of the banking system was successfully stemmed 
by introducing restrictions on capital movements. Greece pushed ahead with reforms, opening 
the way to the release of EUR 16 billion in ESM payments to meet immediate financing needs.
The prospects for continued stabilisation were improved by the consolidation steps taken 
by the Greek banks in the autumn. In order to strengthen their solvency position, they raised 
EUR 9 billion themselves and received EUR 5.4 billion in ESM financial assistance. The improv-
ing stability in the Greek banking sector has reduced the need for ECB emergency funding. By 
the end of 2015, a total of EUR 21.4 billion was paid out in ESM financial assistance to Greece.
Continued commitment to reforms is paramount to ensuring that stability is maintained in 
Greece. Although Greece’s financing needs in 2016 are significantly lower than last year, the 
country will still require financing through the ESM programme in order to meet its debt repay-
ments. It is essential that the programme’s first review is concluded successfully during the early 
part of the year and that Greece continues on the path of reform.
The performance of the Greek economy last year was better than feared. Crucially, it suc-
ceeded to avoid significant economic contraction. However, progress is hampered by remain-
ing restrictions on capital movement, low levels of investment and SMEs’ financing difficulties. 
Tourism is the bedrock of the Greek economy. Indeed, effective implementation of the EU-
level decisions taken in March in a bid to contain the refugee crisis will be vital to ensuring that 
Greece continues to move towards greater stability.
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1.2 Foreign trade
Export growth slower than demand growth 
According to Statistics Finland’s preliminary national accounts data out in March 2016, 
exports increased by 0.6% in 2015. Goods and services exports growth slowed in late 
2015. Sluggish exports growth reflects several factors, above all the structure of the export 
industry and Finland’s poor cost competitiveness. It is projected that exports will return 
to moderate growth, mainly on the back of a slight rebound in world trade and rebound-
ing economic growth in Finland’s most important export markets. Improving price com-
petitiveness will also support the growth of exports.
Exports growth is expected to pick up to 1.3% in 2016. Euro area economic growth in 
2016 will be faster than last year. Continued low oil prices will reduce costs and contribute 
to maintain world demand. Demand for Finnish exports will therefore increase.
There are many different ways to measure competitiveness. Measured by the real trade-
weighted exchange rate, Finnish competitiveness improved in early 2015, but since then has 
shown no change. When measured by unit labour costs, Finnish competitiveness improved 
slightly in 2015 compared with the euro area average. Over the outlook period Finnish unit 
labour cost competitiveness will continue to improve as wage growth remains moderate 
and as labour productivity starts to increase.
In 2017 exports growth will reach 3% and in 2018 pick up further to 3.5% on the back 
of increasing global trade. Finland’s market share in global trade has continued to decline, 
but this trend is now slowing. In the euro area, for instance, Finland has almost regained 
the same market share as it had before the crisis. In the Swedish and Russian markets, by 
contrast, Finland is continuing to lose market shares.
Preliminary national accounts data for 2015 show that the volume of imports declined 
by 0.4% from the year before. Imports will return to growth in 2016 as accelerating invest-
ment growth will increase the use of imported inputs. Consumption will also strengthen 
imports growth in 2016. Exports will drive imports to growth in 2017 and 2018, while the 
role of domestic demand will fade somewhat. 
The contribution of net exports to GDP growth will be negative in 2016, but turn slightly 
positive over the outlook period as domestic demand growth gradually slows down.
Table 5. Foreign trade
2013 2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018**
change in volume, %
Exports of goods and services 1.1 -0.9 0.6 1.3 2.9 3.6
Imports of goods and services 0.5 0.0 -0.4 2.6 3.0 3.5
change in price, %
Exports of goods and services -1.1 -0.8 -1.0 -0.4 1.1 1.3
Imports of goods and services -1.7 -1.6 -3.2 -1.2 1.2 1.4
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Current account close to balance
In 2015 the current account surplus stood at EUR 0.3 billion, or 0.1% of GDP. The deficit 
decreased rapidly during 2015. Over the outlook period the trade and current account sur-
pluses will remain close to balance. In 2018 the current account balance will show a sur-
plus of EUR 0.6 billion, or 0.3% of GDP. The trade balance will remain positive. The deficit 
in the balance of services decreased by around one billion euros in 2015.
The improvement in the terms of trade is the result of a sharp fall in oil prices. Export 
and import prices continued to fall in 2015, but will recover to marginal growth during 
2016. In annualized terms, however, both export and import prices will fall in 2016.
In 2017 and 2018, it is predicted that foreign trade prices will begin to edge up. Prices 
will only rise slowly, however, as sluggish world trade growth means that export prices in 
rival countries will increase only moderately and as oil prices will remain low throughout 
the outlook period. Over the outlook period export prices will follow the same trends as 
in rival countries. The improvement in the terms of trade will therefore come to a halt and 
therefore no longer contribute to improving the current account surplus. The development 
of domestic unit labour costs will also contribute to slow the rise of export prices.
Table 6. Current account
2013 2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018**
EUR bn
Balance of goods and services -1.8 -1.9 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.3
Factor incomes and income transfers, net -1.5 -0.1 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2
Current account -3.3 -1.9 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.6
Current account, relative to GDP, % -1.6 -0.9 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3
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1.3 Domestic demand
1.3.1 Private consumption
Private consumption growth to maintain economic activity
Sluggish investment and disappointing export performance in recent years have added 
greater than usual weight to private consumption as a driver of economic activity. In 
2015 exceptionally moderate inflation supported the growth of household real disposa-
ble income. Indeed, private consumption growth reached 1.4% in 2015, the fastest rate in 
four years.
Private consumption growth has also been driven by the growth of household indebt-
edness, which is attributable in part to the persistence of low interest rates. The ratio of 
household debt to disposable income has continued to rise without interruption since the 
late 90s. Housing loans account for almost three-quarters of total household debt. In 2015 
indebtedness was further accelerated by the 6–12 month loan repayment holidays mar-
keted by banks to housing loan holders. Based on the evidence from the past few months 
it seems that even though the active marketing of these holidays has now been suspended, 
there is at least temporarily an increased willingness among consumers to postpone the 
repayment of their housing loans. In January the total amount of renegotiated housing loans 
stood at EUR 800 million, while the average monthly figure has been typically around EUR 
200 million a month. In the last year households renegotiated their housing loans the total 
value of mortgage rearrangements totalled EUR 14.3 billion more than usually, while the 
total stock of housing loans at year-end 2015 stood at EUR 91 billion. It is estimated that in 
2015, loan repayment holidays increased the ratio of household debt to disposable income 
by about one per cent.
The Statistics Finland’s consumer survey data indicate that consumer confidence in 
personal finances remains weaker than the long-term average. This is explained above all 
by subjective uncertainty and fears about the employment outlook. Despite this climate of 
uncertainty, the results of the consumer survey suggest that consumers still feel this is a 
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good time to make purchases of durables. Indeed the number of new car registrations, for 
instance, has continued to rise since last autumn. Low interest rates and the reduction of 
the motor car tax from the beginning of 2016 are also fuelling the demand for new cars. 
The ageing stock of cars in the country is also driving up demand for new cars. 
Oil and other raw material prices will continue to fall in 2016, which will be reflected in 
sluggish consumer price growth. Low inflation will help to bolster the growth of household 
real disposable income. Given the climate of consumer uncertainty, however, private con-
sumption growth in 2016 will be slower than income growth. The increasing savings rate 
will contribute to slow private consumption growth to one per cent in 2016.
Real wage growth set to slow, confidence set to strengthen 
The forecast for private consumption does not factor in the effects of a possible social con-
tract.  Following long-drawn-out negotiations, there is broad recognition among the social 
partners of the imperative to sharpen economic competitiveness. Indeed it is assumed that 
over the outlook period, collective wage increases will be lower than usual. Moderate wage 
increases will stimulate employment and at the same time dampen inflationary pressures. 
On average, household wage income will increase annually by some 1.5% in 2016–2018. 
The positive employment effects of increased competitiveness will show up after some 
delay. Labour income as a proportion of GDP will fall slightly over the outlook period. 
Improving business profitability will bolster the growth of property income.
During the outlook period the average wage earner tax rate will rise slightly. In 2016 
the insured employee’s unemployment insurance contribution will increase by 0.5 percent-
age points, and in 2017 employment pension contributions will be raised by 0.25 percent-
age points. Following a revision of central government income tax scales and changes to 
the earned income tax credit, the average wage earner tax rate will fall slightly this year, 
but rise in 2017. 
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Rebounding economic activity will increase employment and at the same time help to 
strengthen consumer confidence. Indeed, it is thought that the household savings rate will 
start falling next year. Nevertheless private consumption growth will slow to 0.8%. One 
underlying reason is that household real income will increase by no more than 0.4%, among 
other things because of the effects of rising inflation. Likewise, spending cuts aimed at 
strengthening the financial position in general government will slow the growth of current 
transfers received by households. Despite the freezing of the national pension index in 2016–
2018, the current transfers received by households will increase nominally by an average of 
2.2% a year over the outlook period. One of the factors underlying this development is the 
ongoing process of demographic change, including the increasing number of pensioners. 
Private consumption growth will remain relatively strong compared to disposable 
income growth. The forecast for private consumption growth in 2017–2018 is based on 
the assumption of improving consumer confidence, which will be reflected in a reduced 
household savings rate in 2017–2018.
The development of private consumption involves both upside and downside risks. Based 
on real income development, the growth of private consumption might exceed the forecast 
for the current year, but on the other hand the uncertainty stemming from unemployment 
concerns is undermining the propensity to consume. In other words, a faster than antici-
pated recovery of confidence constitutes an upside risk to consumption this year. As for 
2017–2018, the assumption that household confidence will rebound and that the savings 
rate will consequently fall constitutes a downside risk if the sense of uncertainty experi-
enced by consumers does not dissipate as expected.
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1.3.2 Public consumption
Public consumption accounts for around one-quarter of GDP and for over 40% of total pub-
lic expenditure. The biggest public consumption items are wages, employers’ social security 
contributions and intermediate consumption, i.e. the value of goods and services used as 
inputs in the public sector. Local government accounts for two-thirds of public consump-
tion: this is mainly expenditure associated with basic municipal service provision.
Central government consumption has hardly increased at all in recent years. In 2015 it 
stood at roughly the same level as in 2008. The price of consumption, on the other hand, has 
increased on average by over 2½% since 2008, mainly as a result of wage increases, although 
in recent years prices have risen slowly. The volume of central government consumption will 
not increase over the outlook period due to staff redundancies and other adjustment actions. 
The financing of asylum seeker reception centres will drive up consumption this year. 
In recent years local government consumption growth has been historically exception-
ally slow. Consumption growth has been slowed not only by moderate price trends, but also 
by adjustment efforts by local and joint municipal authorities. Based on 2016 budgets, local 
authorities are looking to continue their fiscal adjustment efforts during the current year. 
Furthermore, the measures set out in the Government Programme to strengthen munici-
pal finances will curb the growth of local government expenditure over the outlook period. 
There are, however, substantial expenditure pressures on local government finances as a 
result of population ageing, which is causing an increased need for services, and as a result 
of increased immigration.
Expenditure by social security funds consists mainly of social benefits in kind paid out 
by the Social Insurance Institution Kela (reimbursements for medicines and travel and 
rehabilitation allowances) as well as wages. Savings measures announced by the Govern-
ment will reduce expenditure on social benefits in kind in 2016–2017.
37
Table 7. Consumption
2015
share, 
%
2013 2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018**
Change in volume, %
Private consumption 100.0 -0.5 0.6 1.4 1.0 0.8 0.9
Households 95.2 -0.6 0.4 1.6 1.0 0.8 0.9
Durables 8.2 -0.8 1.8 6.0 3.2 1.8 1.8
Semi-durables 7.9 0.3 -0.7 0.2 1.4 0.8 0.8
Non-durable goods 26.6 -0.5 -0.3 -0.2 0.8 0.2 0.3
Services 52.2 -0.8 0.1 1.6 1.1 1.0 1.1
Consumption by non-profit institutions 4.8 -1.6 3.4 -1.8 0.0 1.0 1.0
Public consumption 100.0 1.1 -0.3 -0.9 -0.1 0.0 0.0
Central government 26.7 4.3 -1.2 -2.8 0.7 -0.6 -2.0 
Local government 66.1 -0.0 0.2 -0.3 0.1 0.6 0.7 
Social security funds 7.2 0.0 -0.8 1.5 -4.8 -3.4 0.8 
TOTAL 0.0 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6
Individual consumption expenditure in  
general government 0.1 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 0.2 0.6
Total individual consumption expenditure -0.4 0.3 1.2 -0.4 0.2 0.6
Households´ disposable income 2.8 0.5 1.2 1.6 1.6 1.8
Private consumption deflator 2.5 1.6 0.2 0.1 1.1 1.4
Households´ real disposable income 0.3 -1.1 1.0 1.5 0.5 0.4
%
Consumption as proportion of GDP 
(at current prices) 79.5 80.1 80.4 80.0 79.6 79.3
Household savings ratio 2.2 0.5 -0.1 0.4 0.1 -0.4
Household  debt ratio 1) 118.0 122.0 124.9 125.8 126.6 126.8
1) Household debt at end-year in relation to disposable income.
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1.3.3 Private investment
Towards investment-driven growth
Investment rebounded to broad-based strong growth in the last quarter of 2015: annual-
ised quarter-on-quarter growth reached 7%, in the case of private investment as much as 
8.5%. Only R&D investment declined towards the end of the year. Investment growth has 
not increased at such a rate since Q2 2010, when the figures were swelled by a major stim-
ulus package for residential construction. The main driver now is investment in machin-
ery, equipment and transport equipment.
In 2015 gross investment was about one per cent lower than the year before. The figures 
were significantly revised upwards under the new national accounts framework, both for 
earlier years and for last year. The revisions mainly concerned production-related building 
construction investment and, to a lesser extent, civil engineering investment and invest-
ment in machinery and equipment. 
Updated investment forecasts for 2016–2018 predict healthy investment growth, driving 
GDP growth annually by 0.7–1 percentage points. It is estimated that investment growth will 
be fastest this year, reaching around 5%, then slowing to around 3% in 2017. This growth 
is being driven by major ongoing projects in which 2016 and 2017 will see the most active 
stages of investment. In 2018 it is projected that favourable global economic trends will 
boost the acceleration of investment, even though annualised growth will remain slightly 
slower than the year before.
As private investment has declined for four years in succession, the private investment 
to GDP ratio has dropped back to the relatively low figure of 16.3%. By the end of the fore-
cast period in 2018, the ratio will pick up to 18.6%.
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High number of residential construction starts offers unexpected surprise
In 2015 the number of new housing starts reached 31,400, over 5,000 more than the year 
before and well above preliminary estimates and expectations. As a substantial propor-
tion of these starts clustered towards the end of the year, housing investment growth in 
2016 will climb to 5%. It is estimated that renovation investment will develop moder-
ately throughout the outlook period, increasing by around 2% a year, as a large part of the 
building stock is now reaching renovation age.
The projected number of housing starts for 2016 is 28,000. Low interest rates, ease of 
access to housing loans, migration into growth centres and high levels of activity among 
property investors will all contribute to drive housing investment. At the moment the main 
focus of this investment is in growth centres and especially in the metropolitan Helsinki 
area. It is estimated that the construction of detached houses will gradually plateau this 
year and next. The annual growth projection for housing investment in 2017 and 2018 is 
slightly more moderate, but nonetheless solid. 
Major projects driving investment in other building construction 
Investment in other building construction will increase at an estimated rate of around 
8% this year. Growth is forecast for investment in the construction of commercial, indus-
trial and public service buildings. A number of major commercial building projects have 
started up in 2015 in Helsinki and Tampere, for instance, and these projects are set to con-
tinue for a number of years. On the public side, there is much ongoing work to renovate 
and build new hospitals, and industrial projects are also being launched, including pulp 
mills, power plants, data centres and waste incineration plants.  
Investment in commercial building construction varies widely in value from project 
to project. In some cases the value per square metre is relatively low; examples include 
warehouses and industrial buildings. Others can be extremely expensive; hospitals are a 
prime example. The impact of expensive buildings on the volume of building construction 
is significantly greater than that of cheaper projects, even if the number of cubic or square 
metres were the same.
Civil engineering investment benefits from inexpensive oil 
Civil engineering investment increased very robustly last year, showing the highest rate of 
growth since the pre-crisis figures in 2007. Surveys in the civil engineering sector last year 
produced somewhat contradictory information about the cyclical outlook. The results sug-
gested that price competition has intensified and that there is an increased willingness to 
tender. Furthermore, the capacity utilisation rate in the last quarter of 2015 was just 71%, 
the third lowest recorded since 2006. On a positive note, however, the rise in costs has 
slowed by virtue of low crude oil prices. In addition, strong building construction over the 
next few years will keep civil engineering investment on a growth path. The forecast for 
next year predicts accelerating growth, among other things because of the repair debt pro-
gramme. The outlook predicts stagnating growth for civil engineering investment in 2018.
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The only major investment project starting up in 2016 is the functional improvement of 
the railway yard in Helsinki. A number of transport investment projects will reach com-
pletion this year and next, but on the other hand many projects that were launched in 2015 
will only get properly off the ground this year. The repair debt programme will also con-
tribute to offset investment projects that are winding down. Investment projects are start-
ing up, among others, in the energy supply network, the water supply network, the rail and 
metro network, and at airports.
Finland finally to see machinery and equipment investments
The Confederation of Finnish Industries (EK) survey in January 2016 confirmed that 
investment plans in industry were positive for the second time in succession. The sur-
vey results indicate that investment in industry and the energy supply sector is projected 
to show double-digit growth in 2016. Investment in capacity expansion is now expected 
to account for one-half of total industry investment, while last year the focus was still on 
replacement investment. During the past six months capacity utilisation rates have also 
returned to growth in industry, particularly in the forest and metal industries. Invest-
ment plans in these industries as well as in the food industry show the strongest increase 
in 2016. 
The outlook predicts that the strong growth of investment in machinery, equipment, 
transport equipment and weapons systems will continue throughout the current year as 
well as in first half of 2017. This is attributable above all to the machinery and equipment 
acquisitions for the Äänekoski bioproduct mill, which are estimated at EUR 720 million, 
or 7.5% of the total investment item. It is estimated that 70% of the main equipment in the 
project will be procured from domestic suppliers. In the years ahead the rate of investment 
in machinery and equipment will slow appreciably, although still remain above its average 
growth rate, as the favourable global economic trends are expected to bolster demand for 
exports from Finland. 
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R&D investment to turn to growth
R&D investment has fallen for five years in a row at an annual rate of around 3.5–5%. The 
investment survey promises a strong return to R&D investment in industry and in the 
energy sector. Overall the forecast, which covers R&D investment in the whole economy, 
predicts only modest change, as central government investment in research and develop-
ment will fall clearly this year. 
Table 8. Fixed investment by type of capital asset
2015
share, 
%
2013 2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018**
Change in volume,%
Buildings 44.8 -5.0 -5.0 -2.9 6.2 3.3 3.3 
Residential buildings 26.8 -5.3 -6.5 -2.4 5.0 3.0 3.4 
Non-residential buildings 18.0 -4.6 -2.7 -3.7 7.9 3.8 3.1 
Civil engineering construction 10.9 2.2 5.0 6.6 2.2 3.0 0.8 
Machinery and equipment 23.4 -8.7 -0.1 2.7 7.4 2.8 3.0 
R&D-investments* 20.9 -3.7 -3.5 -4.7 2.1 4.1 3.4 
Total 100.0 -4.9 -2.6 -1.1 5.2 3.3 3.0 
Private 80.2 -6.6 -3.1 -1.0 5.8 4.1 4.0 
Public 19.8 2.6 -0.6 -1.2 2.7 0.1 -1.3 
%
Investment to GDP ratio (at current prices)
Fixed investment 21.2 20.6 20.3 21.4 22.1 22.6 
Private 17.0 16.4 16.3 17.3 18.0 18.6 
Public 4.2 4.1 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.0 
* Includes cultivated assets and intellectual property products
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Housing investment in Finland: a brief overview
In 2014 construction investment accounted for around 55% of Finland’s gross domestic invest-
ment. Investment in residential housing accounted for one-half of this, representing 27% of 
gross investment. Investment in residential renovation and in new housing construction are at 
roughly the same level. In Finland housing investment is at a higher level than in virtually all 
relevant comparative countries. In recent years housing investment has reached around 5–6% 
of GDP in just four countries: Germany, Belgium, France and Finland.
International comparisons
There is substantial scatter and variation between EU countries in levels of housing investment 
relative to GDP. In Finland, housing investment has remained at a relatively high level for the 
past 15 years, coming in consistently at around 5–6% (Figure 1). During the biggest housing 
bubbles, the figures even reached double digits. This was the case in Finland during the 1990s 
and in Spain and Ireland just before the financial crisis in 2008.
Figure 1. Housing investment/GDP, %
However in many EU countries the bulk of housing investment consists of repairs and reno-
vation, and new residential construction accounts for only a small proportion of the total. In 
Germany, for instance, renovation accounted for almost 70% of total investment in 2014; in 
Denmark the figure was even higher. In Finland renovation accounts for roughly half of total 
housing investment. The proportions vary over time and from country to country because new 
construction is cyclically highly sensitive. 
As can be seen in Figure 2, Finland also has a much higher level of housing investment than 
the other Nordic countries. In Sweden and Norway, though, favourable economic climates and 
liberal bank lending policies have contributed to drive up housing investment in recent years. 
Economic sluggishness in Finland has reduced housing investment, although the investment 
to GDP ratio is still considerably higher than in the other Nordic countries. 
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Figure 2. Housing investment/GDP, %
Shortage of housing in growth centres
Finland was a relative late starter in urbanisation, and the process is still gathering pace. There is 
still a shortage of housing in growth centres to meet these needs. A recent survey by VTT Finland 
about housing needs through to 2040 and their distribution provides useful illustration of the 
impacts of urbanisation on housing investment (Vainio, 2016). In a scenario where the geographi-
cal distribution of the population follows Statistics Finland’s projection, the survey shows that the 
overall demand averages 25,000 new housing units a year. The second, alternative scenario envi-
sions a future where migration is concentrated in the 14 largest urban regions. It is assumed that 
growth in these regions will continue along the same trajectory as in 2010–2014, when in an envi-
ronment of recession urbanisation growth was not particularly high. In this scenario the demand 
for housing is 30,000 new units a year. One key conclusion from these analyses is that the demand 
for housing exceeds the projections of recent years as well as current housing production levels.
The overall demand for housing is higher in the urbanisation scenario because population 
growth in the growing urban regions requires a corresponding increase in the supply of hous-
ing. Part of the housing stock is in regions with dwindling population bases, where there will 
be no primary demand in the future. 
The population projection assumes that net immigration will remain at around the same level 
as in recent years (17,000 persons a year). The impacts of the growing number of asylum seekers 
since last autumn are not included in the projections, but the VTT study estimates a 30% or 60% 
increase in net immigration from the levels recorded in recent years. The projected increase in 
net immigration would increase the need for housing production by 2,500–5,600 units a year.
Compared with the previous estimate of housing demand, production in the Helsinki region 
in 2010–2014 fell short of the required level by 6,000 dwelling units. Elsewhere, production 
exceeded the required level by 6,000 units (Vainio et al. 2012). At a national level the housing 
production volume was more or less on target, but the regional allocation was clearly out of 
balance. The latest calculation suggests that in the Helsinki sub-region, the total shortfall in 
housing production is around 20,000 units, the equivalent of almost two years’ new residential 
construction in this region (Vainio, 2016). 
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Regulation, limitations of supply, scarcity of competition
One of the factors impacting the ratio of housing investment to GDP is the price of housing 
investment. The Bank of Finland (2016) has compared housing investment prices across the euro 
area. Investment goods in Finland are amongst the most expensive in the euro area. Prices of 
transport equipment and construction are particularly high. In 2014 the costs of residential con-
struction in Finland were 22% higher than in the euro area, while in 2003 Finnish price levels 
were still close to the euro area average. The Bank of Finland study does not directly address 
the reasons for Finland’s high prices, but other studies provide plenty of clues. It is important to 
note that although well-intended, regulation may drive up costs significantly. From a national 
economy point of view, a constant increase in costs as a result of building regulations or a 
shortage of housing supply, for instance, also puts upward pressure on wages and adversely 
affects competitiveness.
Furman (2015) has studied the macroeconomic effects of regulation in the planning con-
text. He points out that strict land use and planning regulation leads to excessive profits, higher 
house prices, lower productivity and employment, and increased social inequality. Finland has 
seen similar problems. A number of studies (e.g. Andersson et al. 2015, UN-Habitat 2014, World 
Bank 2009, Cheshire and Vermeulen 2008) have shown that high land use restrictions adversely 
affect the competitiveness of Helsinki and the Helsinki sub-region.
Both international and Finnish studies have shown that an increased supply of building land 
contributes to increase housing production and to curb housing prices (for a literature review, 
see Laakso et al., 2011). Laakso has studied the associations between the resources available for 
land use planning and housing production in Helsinki and the Helsinki sub-region. His findings 
show how single detached and high-rise construction are dependent in different ways on price 
trends and how the supply of building plots, for instance, ranges from the market-driven sup-
ply for detached houses to the municipal supply of plots for blocks of flats: in the latter case the 
supply is determined not by price but other factors. Laakso and colleagues conclude that the 
realistic supply of building plots in Helsinki is extremely limited, especially for blocks of flats, 
and that this scarcity presents a significant bottleneck for housing production.
Schauman (2014) reviews the international research literature to assess the impacts of 
restricted supply on housing prices. The review indicates that almost all factors restricting the 
supply of housing contribute to increase the price of housing and that the effects are signifi-
cant. In many cases the impact of regulation and restrictions on housing prices can amount to 
tens of per cents.
Production of state-subsidised rental housing high in Finland
State-subsidised housing production as a proportion of total new residential construction is 
higher in Finland than in many other European countries. Following the outbreak of the finan-
cial crisis, in 2009 more than half of the new housing starts were state-subsidised. Since then 
the situation has normalised and state-subsidised production has accounted for 20–35% of 
annual housing production. In the favourable economic climate that prevailed in 2003–2007, 
market-financed housing construction was strong. 
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Figure 3. New residential housing starts in 2000-2015
In Sweden, most interest subsidies for social housing production were discontinued in 
the early 2000s. Following the cuts to these supply-side subsidies, new housing construction 
declined significantly (Lahtinen et al. 2014). The rate of housing investment has long been 
extremely low in Sweden and a cause for some concern. Even though that rate has now been 
rising, housing prices in Sweden have been soaring. In 2014 real prices were up by around 9% 
and last year by almost 15%. At the same time, Swedish household debt relative to disposable 
income has climbed to around 175%, compared to Finnish ratio at around 125% (Turk, 2015). 
Why did last year’s new housing starts come as surprise?
In 2015 the number of new housing starts reached 31,400, over 5,000 more than the year before 
and well above preliminary estimates and expectations. There still remains some concern over 
the coverage and timeliness of construction output statistics. Procedures for the compilation of 
statistics on new housing construction were updated in autumn 2014, but there are still issues 
that need to be resolved. As a result the picture presented by construction statistics had not 
been a true reflection of reality, but possibly a significant underestimate. The introduction of a 
permanent building identifier will in the long term help to provide more accurate data on the 
building stock and on renovation activities.
The number of residential construction starts in 2015 was up 20% from the year before. Meas-
ured in terms of cubic volumes, the picture is rather different. While the construction of smaller 
blocks of flats has increased sharply in response to strong demand from real estate funds, and 
while starts of detached houses continued to fall, the volume of housing starts measured in 
cubic metres was up by just 9% from the year before. 
The number of residential construction starts was exceptionally high in the last quarter of 
2015. Likewise, the number of reservations for state-subsidised dwelling units was clearly higher 
than in earlier years, reaching 8,600, an increase of 17%. One reason was the discontinuation 
at year-end 2015 of stimulus for state-subsidised housing production. This came at a cyclically 
opportune moment in that residential housing starts provided a much needed boost to an 
otherwise slow economy.
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1.3.4 Public investment
Public investment in 2015 was unchanged from the year before, according to preliminary 
national accounts figures. Sales of real estates plunged investment by employment pension 
institutions deeply into the red. State real property holdings were also sold off, but overall 
central government investment increased marginally from the year before on the back of 
infrastructure projects and R&D investments. High levels of general government deficit 
will continue to hamper investment opportunities in the years ahead. However the public 
investment to GDP ratio is not expected to fall. 
The Government’s EUR 600 million investment in overhauling the transport infra-
structure in 2016–2018 will contribute to maintain central government investment. Over-
all, however, there will be hardly any increase in public investment because of the scarcity 
of new infrastructure projects and because central government R&D investment is declin-
ing. Investment in weapons systems may increase to some extent. 
Following a sustained period of growth, local government investment expenditure 
no longer increased last year. Local government investment will nonetheless remain high 
over the outlook period as increasing demand for services and housing and infrastructure 
expansion in growth centres will require substantial investment. A growing debt burden 
will lead local governments to prioritise their investments, however.
1.4 Domestic production
1.4.1 Total output
Economic growth gradually gaining traction
Output turned to slight growth last year. On average gross value added for the economy in 
2015 was 0.6% higher than the year before, marking the end of three years of declining output. 
That said, quarter-on-quarter growth in output was only recorded in the first half of the year. 
Annual growth was mainly driven by private service branches, particularly by ICT industries, 
financial intermediation and real estate services. Public service production and wholesale and 
retail trade declined, as did industrial production and primary production. Services are con-
tinuing to make up a greater part of the economy, at the same time as the share of secondary 
production is falling. Furthermore, sluggish demand for intermediate goods and slow growth 
of purchasing power have adversely affected production in the domestic market. Gross value 
added is still 8.5% lower than before the financial crisis at year-end 2007. 
Despite last year’s growth, major ongoing restructuring in the economy has meant 
that output levels still lag well behind those recorded before the financial crisis, and the 
resources of the economy remain largely underutilised. Furthermore, production capac-
ity has decreased in recent years as a result of plant closures and inadequate replacement 
investment. Investment in production-related fixed assets has decreased for three years in 
succession. The number of people out of work increased by 8.6% last year, and the unem-
ployment rate climbed to 9.4%. It is thought that unemployment is largely structural and 
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that employment needs vary from branch to branch. The number of hours worked in the 
national economy fell by 0.1%, and therefore labour productivity improved only marginally 
by 0.7%. Labour productivity has been poor since the financial crisis, continuing to remain 
3% lower than before the crisis. Part of the reason for this lies in industry restructuring as 
the contribution of high-productivity sectors to total output has declined.
Prospects for output growth remain subdued, but are slowly improving. With strength-
ening domestic and export demand, it is anticipated that gross value added will edge up 
by three-quarters of a per cent this year. In 2017 growth will pick up to 1½%, and remain 
at that rate in 2018. The period of strong cyclical growth in Finland’s main export market 
in Europe has already begun to wane, but it is nonetheless predicted that growth will con-
tinue at a steady rate. This will bolster industries producing investment goods. Growth is 
not expected to accelerate in emerging economies either, but economic activity here will 
remain stronger than in the main market areas – with the exception of Russia, which is a 
major market for Finland. Together with the falling external value of the euro in relation to 
the dollar, this will create stronger demand and bolster the position of export companies. 
It will take some time to turn around the years of decline in cost competitiveness, but the 
moderate wage rises are a step in the right direction. Falling energy and other raw material 
prices will also ease the situation of companies that use these inputs in their production.
Private service branches maintained economy activity throughout 2015, and it is pro-
jected that these business services and new economy services will continue to drive eco-
nomic growth over the years ahead. Exports are expected to recover with the rebound of 
export demand, and this will provide the biggest boost to industrial production, more 
than 70% of which is exported. The majority of services produced are used by the business 
sector, and therefore increasing domestic output will also increase production in services 
branches. Household purchasing power will show only moderate improvement over the 
outlook period, and therefore private consumption demand will not significantly increase 
service production either this year or next. Based on the number of planning permissions 
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granted and last year’s large number of building starts, it is projected that new building 
construction will constitute a major pillar of the economy in 2016. Furthermore, building 
renovation activity will continue to increase throughout the outlook period.
Despite the slight pick-up in growth, the forecast risks remain skewed to the downside. 
A one-sided production structure that is tilted towards raw materials and investment goods 
is delaying the onset of growth, even though world trade has gathered momentum since 
the financial crisis. Furthermore, under the conditions of escalating international competi-
tion some goods categories have not demonstrated sufficient cost competitiveness to bring 
in export orders. A more diverse goods structure and stronger cost competitiveness would 
improve the prospects for output growth in the longer term.
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1.4.2 Secondary production
Demand from export markets outpacing industry output growth
Industry was in recession for a fifth consecutive year in 2015. Value added fell by 0.6%, 
although the slide came to halt in the last quarter of the year. The metal industry was the only 
main sector of the economy that posted some growth, among other reasons on the back of 
orders received in the shipbuilding industry. Output continued to contract in the forest, chem-
ical and electronics industries. Forest industry production was down 0.5%: even though pulp 
and cardboard production both increased, demand for paper is trending to fall worldwide. It 
is estimated that world industrial production increased by close to 2% in 2015, and therefore 
it appears that Finland’s share of world industrial value added continued to shrink last year.
The outlook for industrial production remains subdued. Business tendency surveys sug-
gest that industrial companies have seen no improvement in their outlook during the first 
months of the year. It is projected that output growth will be muted as the value of new orders 
is continuing to fall and order books are lower than normal. A large part of the companies 
responding to the Confederation of Finnish Industries EK survey were still constrained by 
inadequate demand, although that proportion has no longer increased in the first months 
of the year. The turnaround will be delayed until the second half of the year, and businesses 
are continuing to adjust their finished products inventories according to the lowered level 
of demand. Competition has eased somewhat, at least in the non-EU market. In the EU 
internal market, by contrast, competition is tough. The potential export demand for Finnish 
production has been increasing since 2013, and the continuing rebound of export demand 
will see industrial production turn to slow growth this year. The prospects of growth are 
strongest in the forest and chemical industries, which have the largest number of compa-
nies expecting to post growth. The metal industry, which posted positive growth last year, 
is being held back by low order books over the short term. The food industry, for its part, 
desperately needs new markets to offset its losses in Russia. Total industry output is pro-
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jected to increase only marginally this year by three-quarters of a per cent, but in 2017 
and 2018 growth will become more broadly based and accelerate to over 2%. However the 
growth rate is expected to remain far more moderate than in the years preceding the finan-
cial crisis, and in 2018 output will still be more than 20% lower than the pre-crisis figures.
Construction sector to return to growth on the back of residential construction 
Construction output turned to growth last year. After three years of decline, value added 
in construction was up by 0.2% in 2015. Growth took hold early in the year, but this was 
not yet a broad-based trend: performance varied across different categories of construc-
tion. The volume of new building construction increased in the category of public con-
struction as well as in the construction of business and office premises. Residential con-
struction also turned to growth towards the end of the year, although this was mainly 
attributable to the construction of new blocks of flats. Warehouse and industrial construc-
tion began to fall towards the end of the year. Despite the turnaround value added in con-
struction remains 11% lower than before the financial crisis. 
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1.4.3 Services
Services driving domestic economic growth
The recession in services ended in 2015. Value added in services increased by 0.9%, mark-
ing the end of two years of recession. Growth was strongest in information and commu-
nication services, financial and insurance activities as well as in real estate activities. Pub-
lic service provision and trade, by contrast, continued to decline. Value added from ser-
vice production accounted for 71.1% of the national value added last year, which is still 
some three percentage points less than the euro area average. Nonetheless this share has 
increased by 7 percentage points over the past 10 years, so that Finland has been closing the 
gap. The biggest branches have been public services, real estate services and trade.
The outlook in service industries has improved since the end of last year, and expectations 
of sales growth have become more widespread. Sluggish demand is a much lesser obstacle 
to growth in service branches than it is in industry and construction. Rising sales prices are 
expected to lead to improved profitability early in the year. A shortage of skilled labour is 
hampering growth for some service companies, especially in the ICT and real estate branches.
It is predicted that, together with business services, construction will make the strong-
est contribution to output growth in 2016. Construction will be boosted by the increased 
number of planning permissions granted for residential, business and office premises. Fur-
thermore, it is expected that orders will continue to increase over the next few months. On 
the other hand, construction is being held back to a much greater extent than industry or 
service branches by the shortage of skilled labour. Renovation is continuing to increase, and 
therefore value added in the construction sector as a whole will increase by 3% this year. 
In 2017 the growth rate will remain unchanged at around 3%, and the slowdown of non-
residential building construction will slow the growth of construction output to around 
2% in 2018. Despite this growth, the volume of construction output in 2018 will be some 
4% lower than the peak figures of 2007.
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The bulk of services produced are used in the business sector, and therefore improving 
business output has a beneficial impact on output in services and helps to offset the muted 
demand for consumer services. Furthermore, the digitalisation of the economy is set to 
increase demand for information services in the long term. According to the expectations 
of businesses themselves, growth prospects are strongest precisely in information and com-
munications as well as in financial services. These branches have a much larger number of 
companies that expect to see an increase in sales than other service branches. The growth 
of R&D activities will also support the growth of turnover in business services. Growth 
prospects in trade, on the other hand, are depressed by the weak development of purchas-
ing power. In 2016 service output will increase by less than one per cent due to overall slug-
gishness in industry. In 2017 and 2018 service output growth will accelerate to around one 
per cent, the average growth rate in the 2000s. Unlike other main sectors of the economy, 
service production will exceed the pre-crisis level in 2018.
Table 9. Production by industry
2015
share,  
%1)
2013 2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018** Average
2015/ 
2005
 change in volume, %
Industry 19.9 0.0 -1.7 -0.6 0.8 2.1 2.4 -1.1
Construction 6.2 -2.0 -3.5 0.2 3.1 2.7 1.8 -0.5
Agriculture and forestry 2.7 8.3 0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.9 1.7 2.5
Industry and construction 26.1 -0.5 -2.1 -0.4 1.3 2.3 2.2 -0.9
Services 71.1 -1.4 -0.2 0.9 0.7 1.2 1.0 0.7
Total production at basic prices 100.0 -0.9 -0.7 0.6 0.8 1.4 1.4 0.3
GDP at market prices -0.8 -0.7 0.5 0.9 1.2 1.2 0.4
Labour productivity in the whole economy 0.5 0.0 0.7 0.4 1.0 1.0 0.3
1) Share of total value added at current prices.
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Decomposing the forecast into shock contributions
Cyclical fluctuations around the economic growth trend are triggered by shocks that are trans-
mitted into the economy either more or less instantly or after some period of delay. In the 
absence of new shocks, the effect of the initial shock will fade over time and the economy will 
return to its steady state path. Shocks have both direct and indirect effects on real and nominal 
variables. These effects on observed variables drawn from quarterly accounts can be described 
by way of a decomposition of shock contributions.
The Kooma model developed by the Ministry of Finance Economics Department belongs to 
the family of New Keynesian macroeconomic models. It is designed for the analysis of cyclical 
fluctuations, and it can be used to identify statistically unobservable shocks. 
This box decomposes the forecast presented in this report into shocks. The data for the model 
simulation is obtained by calculating the deviation of each observed variable from trend growth 
using a Hodrick-Prescott filter. In other words, the figures do not illustrate the level or the growth 
rate of the variables concerned, but rather the extent to which they deviate from the HP trend and 
how this deviation breaks down into shock contributions. The decomposition indicates how the 
development predicted or observed on the basis of the simulation model assumptions is explained 
as a combined effect of different shocks. Positive observations indicate a level of observed vari-
able that is above the HP trend, negative observations are below the HP trend. No conclusions 
can be drawn from the deviation regarding changes in the level or the growth rate of the variable.
The Kooma model includes 23 observed variables, each with a counterpart in the quarterly 
accounts or other statistical publication. In addition, the model includes 32 shocks derived 
from economic theory. Each shock impacts all variables, but the magnitude of the contribu-
tion varies depending on the significance of the shock to that particular variable. In a linear 
model1  the shocks can be computed using a Kalman filter. Most of the shocks in the model, 
such as the technology and preference shock, are unobservable. Also included in the model are 
shocks associated with observed variables, such as the price of oil, the currency exchange rate 
and shocks associated with foreign economic variables. For ease of interpretation the shocks 
are here divided into six groups: technology, wage and price formation, consumer preferences, 
labour supply, and the residual category of ”others”.
Figure 1 shows the decomposition of shock contributions to GDP trend in 1999–2019. Before 
the financial crisis, when economic growth was at its highest, production growth was primar-
ily explained by the technology and price shock. Finland benefited from advances in technol-
ogy and businesses were in the position to charge good prices for their products and services.
The financial crisis was most clearly reflected in the export demand shock in the residual cat-
egory of ”others”, since it was first and foremost through foreign economic variables that the 
crisis impacted Finland. The overall productivity shock also turned negative after some delay. 
In particular, formerly profitable production lines and services exited industry. The productiv-
ity shock only becomes growth-supportive at the very end of the forecast horizon, where the 
economy is performing in line with the medium-term forecast.
The sluggish rate of economic growth both recently and in the early part of the outlook period is 
explained by low total factor productivity, while the relatively slow rate of wage growth is reflected 
in a production-supportive shock. The slight acceleration of economic growth towards the end of 
the outlook period needs to be backed by the contribution of an increasing labour supply. Accel-
erating economic growth is also supported by continued slow wage growth and low inflation.
Figure 2 shows the decomposition of shock contributions to earnings levels as indicated 
by the index of wage and salary earnings. As a variable balancing labour market demand and 
supply, the development of wages involves numerous positive and negative shock contribu-
tions, even though wages show only little cyclical variation and deviations from the HP trend 
are minor. In 2013–2016 the rise in the earnings level is below the HP trend and earnings have 
increased more slowly than the model’s wage equation would have predicted. During this time 
1 The Kooma model is log-linearised around its steady state. The linearity of the model thus follows 
from an approximation.
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the shock contribution describing wage earners’ bargaining power takes on high negative 
values and explains almost completely the moderate development of wages. The price shock 
explaining the low rate of inflation, i.e. the shock describing the contestability of the goods 
markets contributes to slow wage growth. At the same time, supply-side shocks such as the 
technology shock and the labour supply shock appear as factors driving up wages. At the end 
of the outlook period, when the rise of earnings levels accelerates especially in the medium-
term forecast, the growth of wage earners’ bargaining power and the decrease in the negative 
contribution of supply shocks describe the earnings level approximating its trend growth path.
Figure 1. Decomposition of shock contributions to GDP growth
Figure 2. Decomposition of shock contributions to earnings level
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1.5 Labour force
Unemployment growth comes to halt
Employment fell by 0.4% last year and hours worked declined by 0.2%. As the Finnish 
economy emerges from a sustained period of recession and economic activity continues to 
rebound especially in construction industry, employment will begin to slowly edge up in 
2016. The number of job vacancies has been rising in recent months, which also indicates 
that employment prospects are improving.
Unemployment growth has come to at least a temporary halt, according to both Statistics 
Finland’s sample-based Labour Force Survey and employment service statistics compiled 
by the Ministry of Employment and the Economy. In 2015 the unemployment rate climbed 
to 9.4%, and in January this year the trend of the unemployment rate was unchanged. This 
year’s cautious economic growth will do little to reduce the number of people out of work 
as it is expected that some of the disguised unemployed will return to actively searching 
for work with the increasing number of job vacancies. The projected unemployment rate 
for 2016 is 9.3%.
As GDP growth picks up in 2017 and 2018, employment will continue to improve and 
unemployment will begin to slowly edge down. Nonetheless unemployment will remain 
high throughout the outlook period. In 2017 and 2018 it is predicted that employment will 
increase by 0.4% a year. The unemployment rate is expected to fall back to 9% in 2017 and 
further to 8.7% in 2018.
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Long-term and structural unemployment have continued to grow. In January the num-
ber of people who had been out of work for more than a year was 120,000, some 19,000 
more than one year earlier. According to the Ministry’s employment service statistics the 
number of structurally unemployed people was 217,000, or 16,000 more than the corre-
sponding figure last year. In recent years long-term unemployment has increased in all age 
groups, but most of all among those aged 25–54. Even under improving cyclical conditions 
the high level of structural unemployment will slow the decline in the unemployment rate.
Apart from the lingering weakness of the economy in general, another obstacle to an 
improvement in the employment situation is presented by regional and occupational mis-
match problems between unemployed job seekers and job vacancies. Both Ministry and 
Statistics Finland data indicate that the number of job vacancies increased slightly last year, 
but this has not reduced the number of unemployed persons.
Figures for unemployed job seekers registered with employment offices and Statistics 
Finland’s sample-based Labour Force Survey give a slightly different picture of the level and 
development of unemployment. According to Statistics Finland the number of unemployed 
persons last year averaged 252,000, while figures published by the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy were much higher at 351,900.
At the moment the discrepancy between the unemployment figures reported by Statis-
tics Finland and the Ministry of Employment and the Economy is further accentuated by 
the fact that some unemployed people have given up their active search for work because 
of the weak economic situation. The Statistics Finland concept of unemployment is based 
on the criterion of active search for work, and the inactive unemployed are classified in the 
Labour Force Survey as ‘disguised unemployed’. The differences between the two sets of 
figures are also explained by changes in statistical methods and legislation.
Table 10. Labour market
2013 2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018**
annual average, 1,000 persons
Population of working age (15-74  yrs) 4 087 4 096 4 102 4 107 4 116 4 128
change 12 9 6 5 9 12
Population of working age (15-64 yrs) 3 508 3 491 3 476 3 463 3 452 3 443
change -16 -17 -15 -13 -11 -9
Employed (15-74 yrs) 2 457 2 447 2 437 2 444 2 454 2 463
of which 15-64 yrs 2 403 2 386 2 368 2 370 2 375 2 380
Unemployed (15-74 yrs) 219 232 252 251 244 236
%
Employment rate (15-64 yrs) 68.5 68.3 68.1 68.4 68.8 69.1
Unemployment rate (15-74 yrs) 8.2 8.7 9.4 9.3 9.0 8.7
1,000 persons per annum
Immigration, net 17 18 12 12 12 12
58
Finnish and Swedish employment rates: a comparison by age groups
One of the Government’s key objectives is to increase the employment rate. The Finnish employ-
ment rate is lower than in neighbouring Sweden especially among women aged 25–34 and 
among men aged 55–64.
A comparison of employment rates suggests that in Finland, women at the family forma-
tion age stay at home with their children longer than women in Sweden. A significant incentive 
in this regard is the length of time for which family allowances are payable. In Finland, home 
care allowance is payable until such time as the family’s youngest child reaches three years of 
age. The allowance is paid both for the youngest child and for other children in the family. It is 
likely that the home care allowance encourages women in Finland to remain outside the labour 
market for several years. In Sweden, most mothers return to work after the expiry of 16 months 
of parental allowance. The discontinuation of the home care allowance or a shorter allowance 
period could help to bring the employment rate among Finnish women aged 25-34 closer to 
the other Nordic countries. 
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The mechanism known as the unemployment pathway to retirement, under which employ-
ees are eligible to receive extended earnings-related unemployment security, provides a finan-
cially secure way for employees aged 59–62 to retreat from work before they have reached 
retirement age. Employees opting for the unemployment pathway are most typically men 
working in the private sector. After being laid off, the employee is eligible to receive earnings-
related unemployment security for 500 days (in the future 400 days). If by the end of this period 
the employee has turned 61, he or she is eligible to receive extended earnings-related unem-
ployment security until their pension begins.
This arrangement makes it less painful for the employer to lay off employees and encour-
ages employees over 59 to exit the labour market permanently if for whatever reason the idea 
of working no longer appeals to them. Recently long-term unemployment has risen to a much 
higher level in the age group over 59 than in the age group 55–59, suggesting that large num-
bers are taking advantage of the unemployment pathway to retirement. Discontinuing this 
mechanism would force employers and employees to work together to try and find ways in 
which to prolong employment careers through to retirement age proper.
In Sweden there is no corresponding mechanism to extend earnings-related unemployment 
security. Instead, Sweden has legislation in place which establishes the so-called last-in-first-
out principle: in the event of layoffs those employees who were hired last must be laid off first. 
This provides important protection for older workers against dismissals and so improves their 
employment. In this situation it is likely that a younger employee will have less difficulty find-
ing a new job than someone who is 60 or over. A comparison of employment rates in the age 
group 55–64 seems to suggest that the Swedish model works better.
Employed parents with small children and those aged 59 or over work part-time more often 
than average. However the number of people working part-time in Finland is relatively low by 
international comparison. The numbers working part-time as a proportion of the population of 
working age is clearly higher in Sweden, Germany and other countries with high employment 
rates. If Finland is to achieve a significant improvement in its employment rate, then part-time 
employment will probably have to be increased in the age groups mentioned above. In a situ-
ation of weak labour demand, lengthening full-time employees’ hours of work may temporar-
ily even reduce the employment rate.
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1.6 Incomes, costs and prices
1.6.1 National income
National income refers to domestic primary income, i.e. employee compensations, taxes 
on production and imports net of subsidies, operating surplus and property income. In 
2015 nominal net national income growth increased by 0.9%, compared with 1.9% in 2014. 
This slowdown was due to the slower growth recorded in net operating surplus figures, 
which describe levels of business profitability. In 2015 the growth rate was 0.8 %, whereas 
in 2014 strong growth in property income and entrepreneurial income at 7.3% contributed 
to drive national income growth. 
Among the components of national income, employee compensations in 2015 increased 
by around 1% from the previous year, compared with growth of just 0.2% one year earlier. 
The slower growth rate in 2014 is explained by the 0.2% fall in social security contributions 
paid for the benefit of employees. In 2015 the sum total of social security benefits increased 
by 1.9% and the wage bill was up 0.8%. Revenue from production and imports was up 0.9%, 
at the same rate as the year before. 
Employee compensations as a proportion of national income remained at the same level 
as in 2014 at around 60%. Similarly, net property and entrepreneurial income as a propor-
tion of national income showed no change from 24%. The proportion of employee compen-
sations has increased clearly from the figure of around 56–57% in the early 2000s. However 
the current figure is still a long way away from those recorded in the recession in the early 
1990s. The peak figure was recorded in 1991 at 74% of national income.
It is expected that property and entrepreneurial income growth will come in at 1.8% 
this year and to accelerate further in 2017 and 2018, which will contribute to drive national 
income. Taxes on production and imports net of subsidies will also continue to increase 
over the outlook period with the higher rates of indirect taxation.
During the current year it is predicted that wage bill growth will accelerate from the pre-
vious year, as employment is projected to return to growth in 2016. The wage bill will con-
tinue to grow in 2017 and 2018, but moderate wage development means the rate of growth 
will slow. It is predicted that employee compensations as a proportion of national income 
will fall only marginally towards the end of the outlook period, so there will be no major 
changes in the functional distribution of income over the next few years.
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Table 11. Disposable income
2015
share,  
%
2013 2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018** On average
2015/2005
change, %
Compensation of employees 60.4 0.9 0.2 1.0 1.7 1.4 1.5 2.8
Wages and salaries 48.9 0.9 0.3 0.8 1.5 1.4 1.5 2.9
Employers' contributions to  
social security schemes 11.5 1.0 -0.2 1.9 2.4 1.4 1.5 2.4
Property and entrepreneurial  
income, net 23.6 0.8 7.3 0.8 2.2 4.2 5.1 0.5
Taxes on production and imports 
minus subsidies 15.9 4.8 1.0 0.5 1.4 0.9 1.1 3.1
National income 100.0 1.5 1.9 0.9 1.8 2.0 2.3 2.2
Disposable income 1.0 2.0 1.0 1.8 2.0 2.3 2,2
Gross national income, EUR bn 204.0 207.4 209.4 213.0 218.0 223.9
Table 12. Index of wage and salary earnings and labour costs per unit of output
2013 2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018** On average 
2015/2005
change, %
Index of negotiated wage rates 1.4 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.5 2.1
Wage drift,  etc. 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.8
Index of wage and  salary  earnings 2.1 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.2 2.9
Real earnings1) 0.6 0.4 1.5 0.9 -0.3 -0.3 1.1
Average earnings2) 1.6 1.3 1.4 1.1 1.0 1.2 2.8
Labour costs per unit of output 3)
whole economy 1.8 0.9 0.5 1.0 -0.1 0.2 2.5
1)  The index of wage and salary earnings divided by the consumer price index.
2)  Computed by dividing the national wage bill by the number of hours worked by wage and salary earners.  
  The figures are affected by structural changes in the economy.
3)  Compensation of employees divided by gross value added in volume at basic prices.
1.6.2 Wages and salaries
Nominal earnings, as measured by the index of wage and salary earnings, increased by 
1.2% last year. The standard wage rate was up 0.6%, and other factors pushed up the wage 
index by 0.6%.
In 2016 earnings will develop in line with the new wage settlement negotiated by the 
social partners in June 2015. The Pact for Employment and Growth will push up the stand-
ard wage rate on average by 0.5%. The forecast for the development of earnings is based on 
the assumption that the contribution of factors other than increases to the standard wage 
rate will drive up earnings by 0.7% a year. Therefore it is predicted that nominal earnings 
will rise by 1.2% in 2016. 
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1.6.3 Consumer prices
In 2015 consumer prices dropped by an average of –0.2%, as measured by the national 
consumer price index. This is highly exceptional: it is the first time that average annual 
inflation has been negative since 1955. Several factors combine to explain the slow rate of 
consumer price inflation, but the fall in the world market price of oil is particularly sig-
nificant. Energy prices were down by around 6% in 2015. Goods and food prices also fell. 
As in earlier years, consumer inflation was mainly driven by higher service prices, which 
increased by almost 2%. The harmonised consumer price index, which in contrast to the 
national index does not include owner-occupied housing or interests, fell by 0.2% in 2015.
The inflation forecast for the current year is 0.3% as measured by the national consumer 
price index. In other words, it is anticipated that consumer prices will remain more or less 
unchanged from last year. Inflation is slowed above all by the price of crude oil, which con-
tinued to slide in January, but since then has begun to edge up slightly. It is assumed that 
the average price of oil will be around 35 euros a barrel in 2016, compared with the figure 
of just under 48 euros in 2015. 
The price of energy is not the only factor curbing inflation. As in 2015, the daily con-
sumer goods sector announced early in the year that prices of selected foodstuffs will be 
reduced in response to stiffening competition. Weak demand and lowered import prices 
are also impacting goods prices. Furthermore, second-round effects of falling oil prices are 
contributing to hold the prices of other goods in check. It is projected that service prices 
will post slower than average growth this year at around 2%. 
It is thought that earnings will continue to rise moderately at a rate of 1.0% in 2017 and 
1.2% in 2018. This is clearly slower that the average rate of growth in the 2000s, which is 
well in line with the current sluggish economy and subdued employment trends.
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It is estimated that tax hikes will push up inflation by 0.6–0.7 percentage points in 2016. 
Indirect tax hikes adding to inflationary pressure include the increases to the annual vehi-
cle tax, tobacco tax and fuel oil tax, but on the other hand the reduction of the motor car 
tax will act in the opposite direction. The decision to increase the annual ceiling for social 
and health care client fees by almost 30 per cent will increase inflation by some 0.2 per-
centage points, taking account of the latest information about how these increases will be 
put into effect in each municipality. In addition, reimbursements for health care expenses 
from the Social Insurance Institution Kela will be cut and an initial deductible of 50 euros 
introduced for reimbursements for prescription medicines, which will also contribute to 
drive inflation. Without the effects of these tax hikes, consumer prices would fall in 2016. 
Inflationary pressures will remain lower than usual over the next few years as there are 
idle resources in the economy and the output gap is still clearly negative. It is expected that 
the national consumer price index will increase by 1.3% in 2017, and by 1.5% in the last year 
of the forecast horizon in 2018. Oil prices will edge up over the outlook period and accel-
erate inflation. The forecast is also impacted by assumptions of moderate wage increases, a 
weakening euro and low but gradually rising interest rates.
In 2015 the euro area inflation rate in terms of the harmonised consumer price index 
came in at 0.0%, and prices have continued to rise very slowly in early 2016. Falling energy 
prices have slowed inflation in the euro area, too, but other major items in the consumer 
price basket have contributed to accelerate inflation. The latest ECB forecast is that euro 
area inflation will rise to 0.1% in 2016, to 1.3% in 2017 and 1.6% in 2018. The comparative 
MoF growth forecasts for Finland based on the harmonised consumer price index are 0.1% 
in 2016, 1.1% in 2017 and 1.4% in 2018, so it is expected that prices in Finland will continue 
to rise somewhat more slowly than in the euro area on average. 
Table 13. Price indices
2013 2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018** On average 
2015/2005
change, %
Export prices1) -1.1 -0.8 -1.0 -0.4 1.1 1.3 0.3
Import prices1) -1.7 -1.6 -3.2 -1.2 1.2 1.4 0.8
Consumer price index 1.5 1.0 -0.2 0.3 1.3 1.5 1.7
Harmonised index of consumer prices 2.2 1.2 -0.2 0.1 1.1 1.4 1.9
Basic price index for domestic supply 0.2 -1.3 -3.2 -0.7 1.2 1.5 2.0
Building cost index 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 1.5 1.7 2.3
1) As calculated in the National Accounts
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2 Economic policy and public f inances
2.1 General government finances
Finnish public finances have been running a deficit since the end of the last decade. The 
budgetary position is set to improve slowly in the years ahead, but still threatens to remain 
in deficit. General government debt to GDP ratio has increased for several consecutive 
years, and there is no significant turnaround in sight. To achieve long-term sustainability 
in general government finances, the budgetary position should recover to show a surplus 
of around  2 % of GDP by the end of the decade.
The general government deficit stood at EUR 5.7 billion, or 2.7% of GDP in 2015. The 
deficit decreased from the previous year primarily as a result of substantial fiscal adjustment 
and reasonably strong revenue growth for the general economic environment.
General government in Finland consists of central government, local government, and 
social security funds. The latter are further divided between earnings-related pension funds, 
which manage statutory earnings-related pension insurance, and other social security funds.
Determined fiscal adjustment brought a substantial improvement to the central gov-
ernment budgetary position last year. Over the outlook period the deficit will slowly shrink 
with the gradual recovery of economic growth and continued adjustment measures. The 
local government budgetary position improved in 2015, primarily as a result of reduced con-
sumption expenditure. However, the rising service needs of an ageing population will place 
a heavy burden on local government finances. The local government deficit will increase 
slightly during the forecast horizon. It is estimated that the combined deficit of central and 
local government finances will be somewhat EUR 5 billion in 2020. 
Other social security funds have seen their financial position eroded by high unem-
ployment expenditure. However they are expected to move back close to balance with 
the increase made to the unemployment insurance contribution and with the improving 
employment situation. The surplus shown by authorised pension providers continued to 
shrink last year. It is projected that this surplus will continue to decrease over the outlook 
period to less than one per cent of GDP.
The expenditure to GDP ratio or the expenditure rate continued to rise last year. A major 
contributing factor was the growth of unemployment-related expenditure, but slow GDP 
value growth and rising ageing-related expenditure also made an impact. The expenditure 
rate will stop rising during the forecast period in response to the Government’s adjustment 
measures and the slowdown of unemployment expenditure growth. The tax rate, i.e. the ratio 
of taxes and tax-like levies to GDP, continued to rise in 2015. This was due to indirect tax 
hikes in particular. It is predicted that the tax rate will fall slightly over the outlook period.
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In 2014 the Finnish public deficit exceeded the EU Treaty’s 3% of GDP reference value, 
but in 2015 the deficit came in under that limit. The public debt to GDP ratio has climbed 
to over 60%. A more detailed examination of the economy’s performance in relation to EU 
fiscal criteria is presented in Annex 4 of the General Government Fiscal Plan for 2017–2020.
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Table 14. General government finances 1)
2013 2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018**
EUR billion
Current taxes 32.9 33.8 34.8 34.9 35.6 36.7
Taxes on production and imports 29.3 29.6 29.8 30.4 30.8 31.2
Social security contributions 25.9 26.3 27.0 28.0 28.4 29.0
Taxes and contributions, total 2) 88.8 90.1 92.3 94.0 95.6 97.5
Other revenue 3) 23.5 23.1 23.4 23.9 24.6 25.4
of which interest receipts 2.5 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.3 2.5
Total revenue 111.6 112.7 115.1 117.2 119.5 122.2
Consumption expenditure 50.3 50.8 50.9 51.5 52.2 53.2
Subsidies 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.7
Social security benefits and allowances 38.4 40.3 41.6 42.7 43.6 44.5
Other current transfers 6.0 6.1 5.8 5.5 5.3 5.3
Subsidies and current transfers, total 47.2 49.0 50.2 50.9 51.5 52.4
Capital expenditure 4) 9.1 9.1 9.1 9.5 9.5 9.7
Other expenditure 10.4 10.3 10.5 10.6 10.8 10.9
of which interest expenses 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.5
Total expenditure 117.0 119.2 120.8 122.5 124.0 126.1
Net lending (+) / net borrowing (-) -5.3 -6.5 -5.7 -5.4 -4.5 -3.9
Central government -7.6 -7.7 -6.3 -6.2 -5.5 -4.8
Local government -1.5 -1.6 -1.4 -1.4 -1.3 -1.4
Employment pension schemes 3.7 3.4 2.9 2.6 2.6 2.2
Other social security funds 0.0 -0.7 -0.8 -0.4 -0.3 0.1
Primary balance 5) -5.1 -6.1 -5.3 -4.9 -4.3 -3.8
1)  As calculated in the national accounts, ESA2010.
2)  Incl. capital taxes. 
3)  Incl. capital transfers and consumption of fixed capital.
4)  Gross fixed capital formation and capital transfers.
5)  Net lending before net interest expenses.
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Table 15. Main economic indicators in general government
2013 2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018**
% of GDP
Taxes and social security contributions 43.7 43.9 44.5 44.6 44.4 44.1
General government expenditure 1) 57.5 58.1 58.3 58.2 57.6 57.0
Net lending -2.6 -3.2 -2.7 -2.5 -2.1 -1.8
Central government -3.7 -3.8 -3.1 -2.9 -2.6 -2.2
Local government -0.7 -0.8 -0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6
Employment pension institutions 1.8 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.0
Other social security funds 0.0 -0.3 -0.4 -0.2 -0.1 0.0
Primary balance 2) -2.5 -3.0 -2.5 -2.3 -2.0 -1.7
General government debt 55.4 59.3 63.1 65.0 66.7 67.4
Central government debt 44.1 46.3 48.2 50.0 51.6 52.4
General government employment.  
1000 person 633 625 621 617 616 614
Central government 142 138 136 134 133 131.2
Local government 480 477 474 472 472 472
Social security funds 11 11 11 11 11 11
1)  EU-harmonized definition.
2)  Net lending before net interest expenses. 
Table 16. Fiscal balance and debt ratios in  some EU economies
2015 2016** 2017** 2015 2016** 2017**
Fiscal balance Debt
% of GDP
*Finland -2.7 -2.5 -2.1 63.1 65.0 66.7
Finland -3.2 -2.8 -2.5 62.7 65.0 66.2
United Kingdom -4.2 -2.9 -1.9 88.6 89.1 88.2
Sweden -1.0 -1.1 -1.2 44.0 43.1 42.3
Denmark -2.0 -2.7 -1.9 39.9 38.3 38.8
Ireland -1.8 -1.3 -0.8 98.4 93.9 91.5
Spain -4.8 -3.6 -2.6 100.7 101.2 100.1
Netherlands -2.2 -1.8 -1.5 66.8 66.2 65.1
Luxembourg 0.2 0.5 0.5 21.3 22.7 22.0
Portugal -4.2 -3.4 -3.5 129.1 128.5 127.2
Austria -1.6 -1.7 -1.7 85.9 85.1 84.0
Germany 0.5 0.1 0.0 71.6 69.2 66.8
France -3.7 -3.4 -3.2 96.2 96.8 97.1
Belgium -2.9 -2.8 -2.4 106.1 106.6 105.6
Italy -2.6 -2.5 -1.5 132.8 132.4 130.6
Greece -7.6 -3.4 -2.1 179.0 185.0 181.8
Source: EU Commission  forecast spring 2015; *Finland: Ministry of Finance, April 2016 
69
2.1.1 Estimates of fiscal policy impact
In 2016 general government fiscal policy will be contractionary. Around EUR 700 million 
of the Government’s fiscal adjustment measures will be targeted at central government. 
Furthermore, fiscal policy will tighten as a result of local government adjustment meas-
ures and the increase to the unemployment insurance contribution. It is projected that the 
tax rate in 2016 will be 44.6% of GDP. The tax rate will fall moderately in 2016–2020 as 
the most important tax bases such as the wage bill and private consumption will increase 
more slowly than GDP. The expenditure rate will start slowly to fall in 2016 in response to 
savings measures and reduced cyclical expenditure.
The current fiscal policy stance can also be examined against changes in the structural 
balance as assessed using the EU harmonised method. Structural balance is calculated 
by removing the cyclical effect from the public sector balance. The remainder describes 
the effect of the policy pursued and other than cyclical factors on the balance. Changes in 
the structural balance thus describe changes in the overall fiscal policy stance. When the 
structural balance strengthens, fiscal policy is contractionary. On the other hand, when 
the structural balance weakens, fiscal policy is expansionary.
An examination of the fiscal policy stance based on changes in the structural balance 
does not give the exact same picture as an examination of individual revenue and expendi-
ture measures. It is forecast that the structural balance will slightly deteriorate in 2016, in 
contrast to the conclusion suggested by an examination of individual measures. However, 
the structural balance will improve moderately in 2017–2019.
The difference between the fiscal policy stance measured by changes in the structural 
balance as opposed to that measured the combined effect of individual fiscal policy meas-
ures is explained by several factors that mainly have to do with the measurement of the 
structural balance. For instance, increasing age-related expenditure contributes to increase 
the structural deficit even in the absence of any decisions to increase expenditure.
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Central government on-budget accounts and expenditure in 2017–2020
The spending limits decision included in the April 2016 general government fiscal plan is based 
on the fiscal policy objectives adopted in the Government Programme and on the first spending 
limits decision of the current parliamentary term last autumn.
The Government has announced new fiscal adjustment measures that will reduce central 
government spending by EUR 220 million at an annual level in 2019. Most of these measures 
will be put in place during 2017 and 2018. The net effect of all central government adjustment 
measures adopted during the parliamentary term comes to EUR 2,8 billion, or around 1 % of 
GDP at an annual level in 2019.
In 2017–2020, central government on-budget expenditure will increase nominally by an 
average of around 0.5% per annum. During this same period real expenditure will decrease on 
average by some 0.6% per annum. 
Projected central government on-budget expenditure in 2017–2019 has increased somewhat 
from autumn 2015. Costs resulting from the increasing number of asylum seekers  are driving up 
expenditure. On the other hand, interest outlays on central government debt have decreased 
significantly from the autumn 2015 general government fiscal plan due to the lowered inte-
rest rate forecast. In addition the new adjustment measures decrease the expenditure level .
Central government on-budget balance: estimate 2016–2020, current prices,  
EUR billion
2016,  
supplemen-
tary budget 
proposal
2017 2018 2019 2020
Total estimated expenditure (current prices1) 54.5 55.1 55.4 55.1 55.7
Total estimated revenue 49.1 49.3 50.6 51.4 52.4
Estimated on-budget balance -5.4 -5,8 -4.8 -3,8 -3.3
It is estimated that on-budget revenue (excluding net borrowing) will increase on average 
by around 1½% a year over the budget planning period. Tax revenue growth is predicted to 
average just over 2% per annum. Economic growth is expected to be modest over the plan-
ning period, and therefore tax bases will show only slow growth. In 2020 on-budget revenue 
is predicted to reach EUR 52.4 billion.
On-budget revenue estimates are significantly lower than in the Government’s first gene-
ral government fiscal plan published in autumn 2015. The current economic outlook is weaker 
than one year ago. The weaker macroeconomic outlook means that the tax revenue forecast 
for 2017–2019 has been revised downwards by some EUR 150 million. Furthermore, the Govern-
ment has decided to withdraw the tax on sweets and ice cream from the beginning of 2017, 
which will reduce annual revenue by around EUR 109 million compared with the autumn pro-
jections. The negative impact on tax revenue will be replaced by increasing fuel taxes. Estima-
ted central government interest revenue has been revised downwards by some EUR 50 million 
in response to lowered interest expectations based on past market interest rates and future 
interest rate expectations.
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Factors impacting change in central government on-budget balance compared with 
autumn 2015 general government fiscal plan/spending limits decision, EUR billion
2017** 2018** 2019**
Estimated balance, general government fiscal plan 2016–2019, 28 September 2015 -5.9 -4.9 -4.0
Net savings and increases in central government expenditure in Government Programme 
(Annex 6), excluding financial investments 0.1 0.2 0,2
Lowered estimate of EU membership fee 0.1 0.1 0.0
Revised distribution of costs between central and local government at lower than predicted level 0.1 0.1 0.1
Change due to increased number of asylum seekers -0.4 -0.4 -0.5
Increase in cyclical expenditure 0.0 -0.1 -0.2
Change in projected interest payments on central government debt 0.2 0.3 0.4
Other change (net), including downward revision of price adjustment of expenditures 0.0 0.2 0.6
New tax base changes (withdrawal of tax on sweets and ice cream and increase of fuel taxes 
in 2017) 0,0 0,0 0,0
Changes to miscellaneous revenue and revenue from interests, dividends and sales of shares -0.1 -0.1 0.0
Other factors impacting revenue estimate (including tax accrual data and new cyclical forecast) 0.0 -0.2 -0.3
CHANGE TOTAL 0,0 0.1 0,2
Estimated balance, general government fiscal plan 14 April 2016 -5,8 -4.8 -3,8
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2.1.2 General government debt
General government debt increased to over EUR 130 billion last year. At the same time, 
debt-to-GDP breached the EU’s 60% limit for the first time during Finland’s EU member-
ship. In eight years, general government debt has more than doubled and the debt ratio 
risen by 30 percentage points. The debt ratio will continue to climb in the years ahead, 
albeit at a slower rate.
Central government on-budget debt accounts for EUR 100 billion of total public debt. 
The general government debt forecast is based on the net borrowing requirement figure in 
the state budget and the central government debt forecast derived from that figure. Local 
governments have debts of almost EUR 18 billion and social security funds debts of one bil-
lion euros. In addition, off-budget entities that are included in the central government sector 
have outstanding debts. Loans granted by the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 
to recipient countries are also included in the public debt of countries that have provided 
guarantees to the EFSF. The Finnish public debt figure includes EUR 3.4 billion in EFSF debt.
Furthermore, public debt includes certain other items, such as security deposits related 
to government derivative contracts, debts related to PPP projects, the capital assets of the 
State Nuclear Waste Management Fund and coins in circulation. Internal general govern-
ment debt is consolidated out of the measure of public debt. The biggest single internal 
general government debt item consists of investments by earnings-related pension funds 
in government debt securities.
General government debt to GDP increased by 3.8 percentage points in 2015. The table 
below describes the factors contributing to the change in the general government debt ratio. 
The purpose of the table is to clarify the relationship between the general government budg-
etary position and debt ratio change in the national accounts. A plus sign indicates that the 
factor has the effect of increasing the debt ratio, a minus sign that it decreases the debt ratio.
Table 17.  Change in general government debt ratio and related factors
2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018** 2019** 2020**
Debt ratio. % of GDP) 59.3 63.1 65.0 66.7 67.4 67.4 67.2
Change in debt ratio 3.9 3.8 1.9 1.7 0.7 0.2 -0.2
Factors impacting change in debt ratio 
Primary budgetary position 1.9 1.5 1.4 1.0 0.6 0.3 0.1
Interest expenditure 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2
Change in GDP volume 0.4 -0.3 -0.6 -0.8 -0.8 -0.7 -0.7
Change in GDP price -1.0 -0.3 -0.5 -0.7 -0.9 -1.2 -1.3
Acquisition of financial assets (net) 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.0 0.9 0.8
Other factors 1) -0.4 0.2 -0.8 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
1) Includes privatization proceeds. lending and factors related to the valuation and timing of revenue and expenditure. 
Plus indicates increasing effect on debt ratio. minus a lowering effect on debt ratio.
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The general government primary balance (revenue minus expenditure, excluding interest 
payments) showed a deficit last year, driving debt growth by 1.5 percentage points. Interest 
payments accounted for 1.2 percentage points of the increase in the debt ratio. When the 
level of debt is compared with GDP, GDP value growth has the effect of lowering the debt 
ratio. In 2015 both GDP volume and price increased by around 0.5%, slowing debt growth 
by 0.6 percentage points.
Earnings-related pension funds are running a surplus. In 2015 that surplus was 1.4% of 
GDP (‘Acquisition of financial assets (net)’). The surplus of these pension funds is included 
in the primary budgetary position of general government, but it is not used to pay off gen-
eral government debt. Therefore this surplus must be excluded from the range of factors 
impacting the change of debt ratio. In addition to these factors, central government lend-
ing and factors related to the valuation and timing of revenue and expenditure increased 
the general government debt ratio by 0.2 percentage points in 2015. 
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2.2 Central government
Despite slow GDP growth, the central government deficit decreased in 2015. This was 
mainly due to adjustment measures adopted by the previous government, including a one-
off transfer from the State Pension Fund to the central government budget. Central gov-
ernment expenditure did not increase, and revenue growth was moderate. 
In 2016 economic growth will remain subdued, providing little support for efforts to 
reduce the deficit. The Government’s fiscal adjustment measures are certainly having an 
impact, albeit to a lesser extent than last year, and the central government deficit will shrink 
marginally. National accounts expenditure growth will continue at a slow rate. Although 
discretionary tax measures will contribute to slightly ease taxation this years, tax revenue 
growth will pick up somewhat from the year before.
Economic growth will accelerate slightly in the years ahead, but it is estimated that 
some tax base growth will remain moderate. The low rate of inflation will be reflected in 
tax revenue in particular. Adjustment measures on the expenditure side will continue to be 
the main drivers of the slight improvement in the central government deficit. By the turn 
of the decade it is estimated that the central government deficit will stand at EUR 3.5 bil-
lion, or 1.5% of GDP.  
At year-end 2015 state debt stood at EUR 100 billion. As budgets will continue to show 
deficits through to the end of the decade, central government debt will continue to rise, 
albeit at a slower rate than before. The debt projection for 2020 is EUR 123 billion, or  some-
what 53% of GDP
State guarantees include all guarantees issued by central government, state enterprises, 
state-owned joint stock companies and special credit institutions ultimately backed by cen-
tral government. These guarantees are not an expenditure item and do not show up in the 
state budget, unless the guarantees are called. The amount of government-issued guaran-
tees has increased rapidly in recent years. At year-end 2015 the stock of state loan guaran-
tees was up 15% from the year before, standing at almost EUR 45 billion, or almost 80% of 
state budget expenditure.
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Table 18. Central government 1)
2013 2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018**
EUR billion
Current taxes 12.2 12.6 13.0 13.1 13.5 14.0
Taxes on production and imports 29.3 29.6 29.8 30.4 30.8 31.2
Taxes and contributions, total 2) 42.2 42.7 43.4 44.3 45.0 45.8
Other revenue 3) 8.8 8.8 9.2 8.8 8.9 9.1
of which interest receipts 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4
Total revenue 51.0 51.4 52.6 53.1 53.9 54.9
Consumption expenditure 13.7 13.8 13.6 13.9 14.0 13.9
Subsidies and current transfers, total 37.7 38.2 38.2 38.1 38.3 38.6
to general government 25.8 26.2 26.2 26.6 26.9 27.2
Interest expenses 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.2
Capital expenditure 4) 4.7 4.7 4.8 5.0 4.9 5.0
Total expenditure 58.6 59.1 59.0 59.3 59.4 59.7
Net lending (+) / net net borrowing (-) -7.6 -7.7 -6.3 -6.2 -5.5 -4.8
Primary balance5) -5.6 -5.6 -4.4 -4.2 -3.6 -2.9
1)  As calculated in the national accounts.
2)  Incl. capital taxes.
3)  Incl. capital transfers (excl. capital taxes) and consumption of fixed capital.
4)  Gross fixed capital formation and capital transfers.
5)  Net lending before net interest expenses.
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2.2.1 Central government expenditure
For the first time in 15 years, central government national accounts expenditure showed 
no increase at all last year. Both current transfers and consumption expenditure, the single 
biggest items, decreased. A significant number of expenditure adjustment measures intro-
duced by the previous government were scheduled for 2015.
Central government expenditure growth will remain moderate over the outlook period. 
In 2016 there will be a marked increase in asylum seeker expenditure, which will increase 
central government consumption expenditure as well as current transfers to local govern-
ments and social security funds. Likewise, the Government’s key projects and investments 
in transport infrastructure maintenance, totalling EUR 1.6 billion in 2016–2018, will drive 
up central government expenditure. In 2016 capital transfers, including capitalisations of the 
development finance company Finnfund and Terrafame Oy, new owner of the Talvivaara 
mine, will increase expenditure. On the other hand, the Government’s expenditure adjust-
ments and the low rate of inflation will help to curb expenditure growth. 
Current transfers account for over half of all central government expenditure. Amount-
ing to EUR 32 billion, most of these transfers go to local governments and social security 
funds, but they also include transfers to non-profits, fees paid to the EU, and development 
aid to foreign countries. Almost one-quarter of total expenditure goes to consumption, i.e. 
labour costs and acquisitions of production inputs. Other major expenditure items include 
subsidies paid and property and investment expenditure.
Interest expenses have long remained rather moderate because of low interest rates and 
the country’s strong credit rating, even though central government debt has risen appre-
ciably for seven years in a row. In 2015 national accounts interest expenses amounted to 
4.0% of total expenditure, compared with the peak figure of over 16% in 1997. Central gov-
ernment debt will continue to rise year on year, and at some point interest rates will also 
begin to edge up –and interest outlays as a proportion of total expenditure will therefore 
inevitably increase.
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Impact of increasing number of asylum seekers on central government 
expenditure
The number of asylum seekers arriving in Finland started to rise in 2015, and that number is 
expected to remain high in the next few years. In 2015 the number of new arrivals was just over 
32,000. The forecast for 2016 onwards is 10,000 asylum seekers a year, and that figure is used 
for all projections of immigration-related appropriations over the outlook period. It is expected 
that around one-third of all applicants will be granted asylum. Furthermore, it is predicted that 
three family reunification applications will be filed for each successful asylum applicant, and that 
around half of these applications will be approved. The calculations are based on the assump-
tion that those gaining asylum status will not yet find employment during the planning period. 
Immigration will require additional appropriations in seven administrative branches. This box 
provides a description of the additional expenditure resulting from the current asylum see-
ker situation, which is entered in the 2015 supplementary budgets, the 2016 state budget, the 
autumn 2015 general government fiscal plan for 2016–2019, and the general government fiscal 
plan for 2017–2020. This additional expenditure is on top of the projected figures in the spring 
2015 general government fiscal plan, which were based on the earlier estimate of 3,000–4,000 
asylum seekers a year.
 2015 2016* 2017 2018 2019 2020
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 7 0 0 0
Ministry of Justice 6 24 19 16 13 10
Ministry of the Interior 84 419 121 103 96 94
Ministry of Finance 0,6 0,5 0,3 0,2 0,1 0,1
Ministry of Education and Culture 0 27 92 81 52 36
Ministry of Employment and the Economy 0 84 205 283 268 189
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 0 0 171 227 284 328
TOTAL 90   555   616 710 713 656
* Expenditure estimates for 2016 have been made in autumn 2015 based on the assumption of 15,000 asylum seekers.
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs additional spending needs will arise from the growing num-
ber of family reunification applications and the resulting need for extra human resources in 
embassies.
In the administrative branch under the Ministry of Justice, additional costs will arise from the 
increased number of appeals to courts of law and the use of legal advisers in the asylum see-
king process. In 2017 EUR 8 million and in 2020 EUR 4 million will be allocated to meet courts 
of law costs. In 2017 EUR 11 million and in 2020 EUR 6 million will be made available to cover 
the costs of legal aid offices and private legal advisers.
The biggest increases in expenses for agencies under the Ministry of the Interior will arise 
from the reception of asylum seekers (EUR 65 million in 2017–2020), the reception allowance 
payable to applicants (EUR 7 million in 2017−2020) and the Finnish Immigration Service’s and 
reception centres’ operating costs (EUR 31 million in 2017 and EUR 12 million 2020). Additional 
funds are also earmarked for the removal of asylum seekers and police operating expenditure.
In the administrative branch under the Ministry of Finance, additional funds are made avai-
lable to cover the increased operating expenditure of local register offices and Customs.
Under the Ministry of Employment and the Economy, the biggest expense item consists of 
reimbursements to municipalities for social integration costs. Additional spending in 2017 will 
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come to EUR 157 million and in 2020 to EUR 182 million. In addition, extra resources will be made 
available for integration training through public labour and business services: EUR 47 million 
in 2017 and EUR 5 million in 2020. More resources will also be allocated to cover the operating 
costs of Centres for Economic Development, Transport and the Environment and public emp-
loyment and business services. 
The Ministry of Education and Culture is preparing for an increased level of enrolment in 
basic education (EUR 56 million in 2017 and EUR 5 million in 2020). In 2017 EUR 9 million and in 
2020 EUR 8 million will be allocated to the provision of basic education for individuals over com-
pulsory education age. The number of student places in vocational training will be increased by 
2,000 from 2017 onwards. The annual costs of EUR 21 million will be covered in full by central 
government. Furthermore, funds earmarked for personnel training in education services will 
be made available for teacher training required by the asylum seeker situation.
For the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, the increased number of asylum seekers will 
over time mean increased expenditure on child allowances, housing allowances, labour mar-
ket subsidies, sickness insurance and basic social assistance. The single biggest expense item 
is the labour market subsidy: additional funding needs in 2017 are estimated at EUR 112 million 
and in 2020 at EUR 189 million. In 2017 an additional EUR 51 million will be made available for 
housing allowances and in 2020 and additional EUR 91 million.
2.2.2 Central government revenues
The greater part of central government expenditure is funded out of tax revenue. The 
development of tax revenue depends largely on the overall performance of the economy 
and the structure of economic growth. Tax accrual and the structure of taxation is also 
affected by government decision-making. The most significant tax revenue items are taxes 
on earned and capital income, value added tax and corporate income tax.
The Finnish economy has long been in severe difficulty, which has hampered tax rev-
enue growth. In 2015 national accounts tax revenue increased by less than 2%, standing at 
EUR 43 billion. In recent years the emphasis of taxation has shifted from direct towards 
indirect  taxes.
In 2016 tax revenue growth will accelerate slightly from last year as the economy contin-
ues to pick up. The most significant discretionary tax measure is the increase to the maxi-
mum amount of earned income tax credit, which will reduce government revenue from 
earned income taxation. There will be both indirect tax hikes and tax cuts.
In the medium term annual tax revenue growth will average around 2%. The revenue 
forecasts for the outlook period take account of the discretionary tax measures introduced 
by the previous and current governments for implementation in 2016–2020. 
Other central government revenue includes property income and a transfer from the State 
Pension Fund, which will be used to finance part of central government’s pension expend-
iture. It is estimated that property income will remain at around EUR 2 billion over the 
outlook period. Central government dividend income will remain more or less unchanged, 
and interest receipts will remain at a historically very low level.
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Table 19. Forecasts for certain revenue and demand items impacting taxable income and the tax 
base in 2014-2020, annual change
2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2020/2017**
change, % per year
Taxable earned income and capital income 0,2 2.1 2.0 1.8 2 
Wage and salary earnings  and other income 0.3 0.8 1.5 1.4 2 
Pensions and other social security benefits 5.5 3.2 2.6 2.2 2 1/2
Capital income 12.6 7.8 3.4 2.8 3 
Index of wage and salary earnings 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.0 1 
Operating surplus 6.1 0.8 1.1 3.9 4 1/2
Value of household consumption expenditure 0.3 0.4 0.8 1.6 2 
VAT base 0.1 0.4 1.5 1.8 2 1/2
Petrol consumption -2.5 -1.4 -1½ -1½ -2 
Diesel consumption -1.2 1.6 1½ 1.0  1/2
Electricity consumption 0.4 -0 3½ 5½ 1 
Duty-paid alcohol consumption 0 -3.6 -1 - 1/2 - 1/2
New passenger cars 0.8 4.5 2.2 3.7 3 1/2
Consumer price index 1.0 -0.2 0.3 1.3 1 1/2
Direct taxes
Revenue from earned and capital income taxes consists of receipts from progressive 
income tax, capital income tax, the public broadcasting tax and withholding tax paid by 
people with limited tax liability. The most significant source of revenue is the progressive 
earned income tax, the accrual of which is primarily dependent on employment and wage 
trends. Capital income items include dividend income, capital gains and rental income. 
In 2016 there will be only slow growth in tax revenue from earned and capital income. 
This is due to sluggish economic growth and decisions made on discretionary tax meas-
ures. Introduced from the beginning of 2016, the increased maximum amount of earned 
income tax credit will have the effect of reducing tax revenue. 
In 2017–2020 revenue from earned income and capital income tax will increase on aver-
age by 2% a year. Wage bill growth will accelerate towards the end of the forecast period, 
and at the same time employment will improve. Furthermore, pension income will increase 
with the growing number of pensioners and with increasing average pension earnings.
The earned income and capital income tax forecast assumes that in 2017–2020, index 
adjustments will be carried out to ensure that the tax burden on labour does not increase 
as a result of higher earnings levels.
Revenue from the corporate income tax paid by businesses on their profits is shared 
between central government and local government. From the beginning of 2016, the share 
formerly allocated to parishes has been replaced by an indexed appropriation. The cor-
porate income tax projection assumes that revenue will develop in line with the national 
accounts operating surplus. 
80
Table 20. Impact of change in selected tax base items on tax revenue
Tax category Tax base / Demand item Change Change in tax revenue, 
EUR million
Taxes on earned income Wage and salary earnings 1-pp 384 of which central govt. 125 
and local govt. 174 
Pension incomes 1-pp 121, of which central govt. 30 
and local govt. 80
Capital income tax Investment income 1-pp 35
Corporate tax Operating surplus 1-pp
42, of which central govt. 30 
and local govt. 12
VAT Value of private consumption 1-pp 121
Car tax Sales of new cars thousands 7
Energy tax Electricity consumption * 1% 9
Petrol consumption 1% 13
Diesel consumption 1% 13
Duty on alcoholic beverages Alcohol consumption 1% 13
Duty on cigarettes Cigarette consumption 1% 8
*excl. manufacturing industries, datacenters and greenhouses
In 2016 operating surplus growth will be slow. Revenue from corporate income tax, how-
ever, will show moderate growth. Central government revenue from corporate income tax 
will increase with the expiry of temporary tax base revisions, most notably the expiry of the 
temporary increase in the share of corporate income tax revenue paid to local governments. 
In 2017–2020 no revisions will be made to the tax bases of corporate income tax, and it is 
projected that tax revenue will increase at more or less the same rate as operating surplus.
Revenue from withholding tax on interest consists mainly of household interest rev-
enue on deposits. This revenue has fallen sharply in recent years due to low interest rates. 
It is anticipated that revenue from withholding tax on interest will only begin to edge up 
towards the end of the forecast horizon with rising interest rates.
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Table 21. Central government on-budget revenue: estimates for 2012-2018, EUR billion 
2015
provisional 
financial 
accounts
2016
budget  
incl. sup-
plementary 
budget 
2017** 2018** 2019** 2020** 2020/2016**
annual 
change, 
%
Total tax revenue estimates 39.9 40.8 41.6 42.3 43.6 44.5 2 
Income and wealth taxes 1 12.6 12.9 13.2 13.6 14.2 14.6 3 
Taxes based on turnover 17.6 17.8 18.0 18.3 19.0 19.5 2 
Excise duties 6.8 7.1 7.2 7.2 7.3 7.3 1 1/2
Other taxes 3.0 3.0 3.2 3.1 3.2 3.2 1 1/2
Miscellaneous revenue 6.1 5.4 5.2 5.4 5.5 5.6 -1 1/2
Interest income and profit  
entered as income 2.4 2.5 2.0 2.5 1.9 1.9 -2 1/2
Total revenue estimates 49.0 49.1 49.3 50.6 51.4 52.4 1
1 Incl. YLEtax from 2013 onwards (on average 500  EUR million per year).
Indirect taxes
The most important source of indirect tax revenue is VAT, accounting for around one-
third of revenue in the state budget. It is estimated that national accounts VAT revenue 
will increase by an annual average of just over 2% over the outlook period. VAT revenue 
growth will be held in check by slow inflation.
Two changes will be made to the levying of VAT during the outlook period, which will 
result in one-off postponements of tax remittance dates to the following year. Firstly, start-
ing from 2017, small businesses will have the option to pay their VAT returns on a cash 
basis. Secondly, the administration of VAT on imports will be taken over from Customs by 
Finnish Tax Administration in 2018.
The motor car tax is cyclically highly sensitive. The tax was reduced from the begin-
ning of 2016, and the Government is committed to gradually lowering it further through 
to 2019. The motive behind the decision to phase in these tax changes over time is to try 
to curb their impact on consumer behaviour and to avoid undue disruptions in the auto 
market that might follow from a major one-off tax reform and from a sudden reduction in 
stock values. A further concern is to avoid unfair consumer wealth effects.
The vehicle tax is a time-based tax that is levied on an ongoing basis in 12-month peri-
ods on passenger cars, vans and heavy goods vehicles. Revenue from the vehicle tax is rel-
atively stable. The vehicle tax will be increased from the beginning of 2017. In addition, a 
new annual tax will be introduced on registered boats and motor vehicles.`
There have been significant changes to energy taxation in recent years. Taxes on heat-
ing fuels were raised from the beginning of this year, while the peat tax was lowered from 
the beginning of March. In its spring 2016 spending limits discussions the Government 
decided to increase the tax on transport fuels. Revenue from other excise duties is usually 
highly stable, assuming there are no tax base changes. The tobacco tax will be progressively 
raised from the beginning of the current year through to 2019.
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Table 22. Impact of discretionary tax measures on general government tax revenue
2015 2016 2017** 2018** 2019** 2020**
EUR million
Earned income taxes -184 -515 -319 -144 -218 -309
Average increase in municipal tax rate 101 36 0 0 0 0
Investment income tax 100 51 11 0 0 0
Corporate tax -85 122 63 -8 0 0
Other direct taxes -122 25 9 -64 -40 0
Value-added tax 21 0 -149 -200 0 0
Energy taxes 267 103 128 -12 49 -4
Other indirect taxes 156 94 138 68 68 34
Social security contributions 376 677 33 95 96 -21
2.2.3 On-budget accounts and national accounts
The central government on-budget deficit stood at EUR 4.7 billion in 2015. The corre-
sponding national accounts deficit was EUR 6.3 billion. This is quite a noticeable differ-
ence. In 2010–2013, the national accounts deficit was smaller than the on-budget deficit, 
whereas in 2014–2015 the national accounts deficit was larger.
One significant factor explaining the difference between the on-budget net financing 
requirement and national accounts net lending comes from financial investments. Financial 
investments such as central government loans and share purchases and sales are entered 
in the state budget as expenditure. Loan repayments, revenue from share sales, etc., are 
accordingly entered on the revenue side. In the national accounts, these items are entered 
as financial transactions, which do not affect central government’s fiscal balance as meas-
ured by net lending. Various capitalisations in particular can often be subject to difficult 
interpretation. Some capitalisations are paid capital transfers, which adversely affect the 
national accounts fiscal balance, while others are regarded as financial investments, which 
have no effect on the national accounts balance.
National accounts interest outlays in 2015 were EUR 0.75 billion higher than on-budget 
interest outlays, which is mainly due to the fact that national accounts interest payments do 
not include the downward effect of interests on derivative instruments (swaps and futures), 
in contrast to the on-budget figures. By using derivatives, the Treasury has managed to 
achieve quite a significant reduction in the level of real interest payments from the state 
budget. In the national accounts, derivative contracts are recorded as financial transactions 
that have no effect on financial position.
The national accounts concept of central government comprises not only on-budget enti-
ties, but also extra-budgetary funds (excluding the State Pension Fund), universities, prop-
erty companies, the Finnish Broadcasting Company YLE, VTT Technical Research Cen-
tre, and Solidium. In 2016  Finnish Industry Investment Ltd is classified in the state sector.
One significant difference comes from the use of deferrable appropriations. These are 
two or three-year grants that are entered in the budget for one year only. In the national 
accounts, deferrable appropriations are entered on the basis of their use. The net effect of 
deferrable appropriations can vary widely from year to year.
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Table 23. On-budget balance and central government net lending1)
 2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018**
EUR billion
On-budget surplus (+)/deficitT (-)  2) -6.6 -4.7 -5.4 -5.8 -4.8
Privatization proceeds (net proceeds from equity sales) -0.1 0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
Financial investment, net -0.7 -0.6 -0.8 -0.6 -0.7
Rvenue surplus in off-budget units -1.2 -0.9 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
Cash/accrual basis adjustment 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other adjustment items 3) 0.4 -0.5 0.7 1.6 1.4
Central government net lending (+) /-borrowing (-) -7.7 -6.3 -6.2 -5.5 -4.8
1)  In national accounts terms.
2)  Incl. government debt servicing. 
3)  Incl. debt cancellations,  profit on reinvested foreign direct investments, super dividends
2.3 Local government
According to preliminary national accounts figures, the financial position of the local gov-
ernment sector showed a deficit of 0.7% to GDP. This was slightly less than the year before. 
Consumption expenditure growth was marginal at less than one percentage point. Invest-
ment expenditure growth also came to halt after increasing over a long period. The slug-
gish economy and cuts to central government transfers to local government meant that 
tax revenue and central government transfer growth were slow. 
In 2016 the local government deficit will remain unchanged at the same level as last 
year. Overall revenue growth will remain subdued in an environment of slow economic 
growth and a difficult labour market situation. In fact local government tax revenue is set 
to decline this year with the expiry in January of the temporary increase in the share of 
corporate income tax revenue to local governments. Central government transfers to local 
governments will nonetheless increase appreciably with the statutory revision of the distri-
bution of costs between central and local government, in which basic prices and finances 
are adjusted to reflect true costs. 
Central government measures will have the net effect of strengthening local govern-
ment finances this year. Local and joint municipal authorities will also continue efforts to 
consolidate their finances. Even so only 48 municipalities decided to raise their income tax 
rates at the start of the year. The average municipal tax rate rose by 0.04 percentage points, 
increasing municipal tax revenue by some EUR 40 million.  
Since the start of 2016 the Government has allowed municipalities to charge higher fees 
for services provided in a bid to consolidate their finances. So far, however, several local and 
joint municipal authorities have decided to refrain from increasing their social and health 
care or day care charges as provided for in the Government Programme. Based on the 2016 
municipal budgets, the main focus of municipalities’ own fiscal adjustment efforts will be 
on measures designed to curb expenditure growth. Personnel costs will be reduced primar-
ily through natural attrition. As in earlier years, layoffs and terminations will be avoided as 
far as possible. Thanks to these adjustment efforts, overall local government expenditure 
will rise only moderately in 2016.
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Local government debt ratio set to continue to rise sharply
Local government finances will remain firmly in deficit in the years ahead. The 2017–2020 
outlook is based on a pressure projection that only considers such specified and agreed 
measures that are included in the general government fiscal plan. The assessment does not 
take account of municipalities’ and joint municipal authorities’ fiscal adjustment measures 
for 2017–2020. The municipal tax rates are held constant at 2016 level. The outlook does 
not reflect the social and health care reform nor the reform of regional administration. 
Tax revenue growth will pick up as the economy continues to rebound, but will none-
theless remain historically muted. The consolidation measures set out in the Government 
Programme, including the decision to freeze the central government transfers index at its 
current level in 2016–2019, will contribute to slow the growth of central government trans-
fers to local government. Furthermore, the amount of transfers received by local govern-
ments will decrease in 2017 as the Social Insurance Institution Kela takes over the payment 
of basic income support. This will have very little impact on local government net lending in 
that the social benefits and allowances paid out by municipalities will decrease accordingly.
The Government Programme’s adjustment measures will continue to slow the growth 
of consumption expenditure in 2017–2020. Some of the proposed measures to strengthen 
local government finances have not yet taken concrete shape, however. Among the meas-
ures set out in Annex 6 that as yet remain unspecified are the incentive system for special-
ised health care and the reduced planning obligations in social and health care services. It 
is estimated that these steps will have the effect of strengthening local government finances 
by over EUR 200 million at an annual level in 2020. Furthermore, the Government is com-
mitted to reducing municipalities’ duties and obligations by a total of one billion euros. The 
proposed measures listed in the action plan so far are estimated to generate long-term cost 
savings of over EUR 400 million. However these measures have not yet assumed concrete 
enough form for them to be taken into account in the general government fiscal plan or in 
the outlook for local government finances. The final impact of central government meas-
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Table 24. Local government 1)
2013 2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018**
EUR billion
Taxes and social security contributions 20.7 21.2 21.9 21.7 22.1 22.7
  of which municipal tax 17.9 18.2 18.6 18.8 19.1 19.5
corporate tax 1.5 1.4 1.7 1.3 1.3 1.4
real estate tax 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8
Other revenue 2) 18.4 18.5 18.4 19.0 18.8 19.2
of which interest receipts 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
of which transfers from central government 13.9 13.8 13.7 14.3 13.9 14.0
Total revenue 39.1 39.6 40.2 40.8 40.9 41.9
Consumption expenditure 33.1 33.4 33.7 34.1 34.7 35.7
of which compensation of employees 21.7 21.6 21.7 21.7 21.7 22.0
Income transfers 3.1 3.1 3.3 3.4 2.7 2.7
of which social security benefits and allowances 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 0.7 0.7
subsidies and oher transfers 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
interest expenses 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Capital expenditure 3) 4.5 4.7 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9
Total expenditure 40.6 41.2 41.6 42.1 42.2 43.3
Net lending (+) / net borrowing (-) -1.5 -1.6 -1.4 -1.4 -1.3 -1.4
Primary balance 4) -1.5 -1.7 -1.5 -1.5 -1.4 -1.4
1) As calculated in the national accounts.
2) Incl. capital transfers and consumption of fixed capital.
3) Gross capital formation and capital transfers.
4) Net lending before net interest expenses.
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ures on local government finances will also depend on the extent to which autonomous 
municipalities implement them.
The local government sector will remain under substantial expenditure pressure in the 
years ahead. Over the outlook period both population ageing and higher levels of immi-
gration will increase the demand for municipal services. Despite the tense economic situa-
tion, investment by the local government sector will remain high. The provision of services 
and infrastructure especially in growth centres and measures to reduce the so-called repair 
debt continue to require substantial investment. Local governments must nonetheless weigh 
the risks associated with increasing their debt burden when making investment decisions.
The local government debt to GDP ratio has continued to rise year on year throughout 
the 2000s, with just a couple of exceptions. Despite fiscal adjustment, the debt ratio is set 
to continue to grow over the outlook period. This is a cause of some concern from a sus-
tainability point of view in that population ageing will continue to increase the demand for 
municipal services and weigh down on local government finances for the next two decades. 
In order to achieve a permanent solution to the imbalance between revenue and spending 
it is therefore imperative that the social and health care reform be carried out and that the 
unspecified actions in the Government Programme be given concrete shape. It is also par-
amount that municipalities persist with the efforts they have made in the past few years to 
improve efficiencies in their operation. Without structural reforms and steps to curb spend-
ing, there will be significant upward pressure on municipal tax rates in the years ahead.
Local government accounting and national accounts: how they differ 
The closest local government accounting equivalent to the national accounts concept of 
net lending is the cash flow from operations and investments (financial position). The two 
accounting systems define sector boundaries differently, and the same goes for the timing 
of concepts and entries. The reasons for the differences between the cash flow from oper-
ations and investments in local government accounting and net lending in the national 
accounts are examined in the table below.
The most important conceptual difference stems from sector definitions. Local govern-
ment accounting is concerned with local government finances as defined in the statistics on 
local government finances, i.e. municipalities, joint municipal authorities and municipal 
enterprises. Excluded from local government finances under these statistics are such oper-
ations that are conducted by an independent legal entity, for instance in the form of a lim-
ited liability company. The national accounts definition of the local government sector, on 
the other hand, does include such municipally-owned enterprises that are treated as units 
serving their parent entity. Länsimetro, the underground constructor owned by the cities of 
Espoo and Helsinki, for instance, is classified in the national accounts under the local gov-
ernment sector, but in the statistics on municipal finances and activities it is not included 
in local government finances. Likewise, the New Children’s Hospital Foundation as well as 
the real estate company that is building the hospital are classified in the national accounts 
under the local government sector. The foundation and the real estate company are con-
trolled by general government and they produce services primarily for general government.
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Table 25. Financial position in local government accounting and local government net lending
2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018**
EUR billion
Cash flow from municipalities’ and joint municipal authorities’ 
operations and investments -0.1 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.1
Other than municipalities’ and joint municipal authorities’ net lend-
ing effect 1) -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
Effect of municipalities’ and joint municipal authorities’ operations 
outside the local government sector -0.6 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
Acquisitions and sales of shares -0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
Differences in concepts of property expenditure and income -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Timing differences -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Other differences 2) -0.1 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
Local government net lending (+)/borrowing (-) -1.6 -1.4 -1.4 -1.3 -1.4
1) Corporations classified under local government but not included in statistics on municipal finances as well as Government of Åland, Association of 
  Finnish Local and Regional Authorities, Local Government Employers and Municipal Guarantee Board. 
2) E.g. differences in capital transfers and investment grants. 
Source: Statistics Finland, MoF
In the national accounts, the local government sector comprises the non-market activi-
ties of local and joint municipal authorities, which are primarily financed from tax revenue 
and by compulsory payments. Public corporations that primarily finance their operations 
from sales revenue from other sectors, such as water, waste and energy management as well 
as port activities, are therefore classified in the national accounts in the corporations sector, 
outside the local government sector. The joint municipal authority HSY (Helsinki Region 
Environmental Services) is also classified in the corporations sector.
Statistics on municipal finances and national accounts have different definitions for 
the concept of investment expenditure. In the national accounts, acquisitions and sales of 
shares and equities are recorded as financial transactions and not under local government 
investment expenditure. Statistics on municipal finances, on the other hand, record share 
acquisitions as investments in fixed assets.
There are also differences in the concepts of property expenditure and incomes. In the 
national accounts, changes in the value of assets and liabilities are not included in income 
or expenditure. Therefore, municipalities’ and joint municipal authorities’ other financing 
costs and income (with the exception of dividends and interests) are not included in the 
national accounts definition of net lending.
There are also differences in the timing of entries in local government accounting and in 
the national accounts. In local governments’ accounts, tax revenue describes the amount of 
tax collected during the calendar year. In the national accounts, tax revenue for the year in 
question is based on the tax authorities’ accounts of tax remittance from February through 
to the end of January the following year. This is intended to take into account the timing 
difference between advance tax payments and remittance to government.
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2.4 Social security funds
2.4.1 Earnings-related pension funds
The surplus of earnings-related pension funds fell to 1.4% of GDP in 2015, compared with 
the average of around 3% since 2000. Earnings-related pension expenditure has risen 
sharply in recent years with the growing number of pensioners and with the higher average 
level of pensions: new, starting pensions are higher than old ones in payment. The weaker 
employment situation and slower rise in earnings have in turn dampened the growth 
of incomes from contributions, even though pension contribution rates have increased 
sharply in recent years. Low interest rates have reduced pension funds’ property income. 
However rising asset prices and stock prices in particular have increased the total value of 
pension assets to over EUR 180 billion at year-end 2015.
The growing number of pensioners and the higher average level of new pensions will con-
tinue to drive the growth of earnings-related pension expenditure throughout the forecast 
horizon. Slower inflation and expected moderate rises in earnings mean that annual indexa-
tions of pensions will remain at around one per cent in 2016–2020. During this same period 
earnings-related pension expenditure will increase at an annual average rate of around 4%. 
Earnings-related pension expenditure to GDP will climb to over 13% in 2020, compared 
with the figure of around 8½% in 2008.
In connection with the 2017 pension reform agreement, the central labour market organ-
isations agreed on a 0.4 percentage point increase to the earnings-related pension contri-
bution in 2017. In addition, the decision was made to freeze the contribution to this level 
of 24.4% in 2017–2019. The latest long-term projections by the Finnish Centre for Pensions 
indicate that this contribution level will be sufficient to finance pensions even beyond 2019.
In the medium term, the freezing of pension contributions at the 2017 level will reduce 
the surplus of pension funds, as the growth-slowing effects of the pension reform on pen-
sion expenditure will only begin to take hold in the 2020s. Moderate wage increases and 
muted employment growth mean that wage bill growth will remain slow, which will be 
directly reflected in revenue from pension contributions. It is projected that pension funds’ 
revenue from property income will turn to moderate growth during the outlook period as 
interest rates begin to pick up. In 2016–2020 the surplus in earnings-related pension funds 
will gradually fall from just over to just under one per cent of GDP.
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Table 26. Finances of social security funds1)
2013 2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018**
EUR billion
Investment income 3.7 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.9 4.4
Social security contributions 25.9 26.3 27.0 28.0 28.4 28.9
of which contibutions paid by employers  17.9 17.9 18.3 18.8 19.0 19.3
contributions paid by insured 8.0 8.4 8.7 9.2 9.4 9.7
Transfer from general government 13.2 13.9 14.3 14.1 14.7 14.8
Other revenue 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
Revenue 43.3 44.2 45.3 46.2 47.7 48.7
Consumption expenditure 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.5 3.5 3.6
Social security benefits and allowances 33.0 34.7 35.9 37.0 38.5 39.3
Other outlays 3.0 3.2 3.7 3.4 3.5 3.5
Expenditure 39.6 41.5 43.3 44.0 45.4 46.4
Net lending (+)  / net borrowing (-) 3.7 2.7 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.3
Earnings-related pension schemes 3.7 3.4 2.9 2.6 2.6 2.2
Other social security funds 0.0 -0.7 -0.8 -0.4 -0.3 0.1
Primary balance 2) 2.0 1.2 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.5
1)  As calculated in the National Accounts. 
2)  Net lending before net interest expenses.
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2.4.2 Other social security funds
Other social security funds consist mainly of the Social Insurance Institution (Kela) and 
the Unemployment Insurance Fund, which are responsible for the provision of basic 
security and for earnings-related unemployment security, respectively. The expenditure 
of other social security funds increased by close to 3% in 2015. This was in large part 
attributable to an almost 8% increase in unemployment expenditure. Sickness insurance 
expenditure increased by 2% last year, around the average for the past few years. Because 
of the growth of unemployment expenditure the financial position of other social secu-
rity funds turned to a deficit of 0.4% of GDP last year, even though transfers from central 
and local government to other social security funds increased by around EUR 200 million 
from the previous year.
The deficit of other social security funds will shrink appreciably this year since the unem-
ployment insurance contribution was raised by one percentage point from the beginning of 
this year. As is current practice, this increase was split between employers and employees. The 
forecast assumes that the increase will remain in force for the time being and that by virtue of 
this increase other social security funds will move close to balance over the outlook period. 
Without the increase to the unemployment insurance contribution rate, the Unemployment 
Insurance Fund would soon have breached its statutory debt ceiling, with earnings-related 
unemployment expenditure in 2016 already standing almost 50% higher than in 2012.
Unemployment expenditure growth will come to a halt in 2016 and it is expected that 
from 2017 onwards, with the gradual improvement in the employment situation, unemploy-
ment expenditure will begin to fall. Cuts to earnings-related unemployment security and 
job alternation leave compensation will also contribute to reduce unemployment spend-
ing. Cuts and savings will also be made in medical and health care reimbursements, sick-
ness and parental allowances, general housing allowance, student financial aid and adult 
education subsidies. The only measure that will drive up expenditure is the increase to the 
amount of guarantee pension.
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Benefits and allowances tied to the national pension index were revised downwards by 
0.4% from the start of 2016 in response to falling consumer prices. In line with the Gov-
ernment’s spending limits decision in the beginning of April, benefits tied to the national 
pension index will be cut by 0.85% in 2017 and will not be increased in 2018–2019. This 
does not, however, apply to basic income support, payment of which will be taken over 
from local governments by the Social Insurance Institution from the beginning of 2017. The 
indexation of child allowances and student financial aid will also be discontinued. All in 
all, the measures adopted by the Government will significantly reduce the expenditure of 
other social security funds at an annual level in 2019. The savings achieved will largely be 
reflected in a reduced level of central government transfers to other social security funds.
Table 27. Social security contributions rates and pension indices
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017** 2018**
Social insurance contributions 1)
Employers
Sickness insurance 2.04 2.14 2.08 2.12 2.02 2.06 
Unemployment insurance 2.32 2.20 2.33 2.85 2.85 2.85 
Earnings-related  pension insurance 17.35 17.75 18.00 18.00 18.15 18.15 
Local government pension insurance 24.00 23.79 23.65 23.21 22.96 22.96 
Employees
Sickness insurance 2.04 2.16 2.10 2.12 1.97 2.03 
Unemployment insurance 0.60 0.50 0.65 1.15 1.15 1.15 
Earnings-related pension insurance 5.45 5.85 6.00 6.00 6.25 6.25 
Pensioners
Sickness insurance 1.47 1.49 1.49 1.47 1.42 1.44 
Pension indices
Earnings-related index (over 65) 2475 2509 2519 2519 2531 2560 
National pension index 1609 1630 1637 1631 1631 1631 
1) Annual averages. The contributions of employers and the unemployment and employment pension contributions of beneficiaries as percentages of  
 wages and salaries.  The figures are weighted averages.
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2.5 Long-term sustainability of public finances
Despite fiscal adjustment, it is anticipated that balance will not be restored in public 
finances in the medium term, even though the increase in the public debt to GDP ratio 
will slow in the next few years. The challenge of balancing public finances is further com-
pounded by population ageing, which is driving up pension expenditure as well as health 
care and long-term care costs. The slowdown of productivity growth and stalling labour 
input growth are in turn curbing economic growth and therefore slowing tax revenue 
growth.
The long-term difference between general government revenue and spending is meas-
ured by the sustainability gap. In other words, the sustainability gap is the current value of 
future public finance deficits. The sustainability gap indicates the extent of medium-term 
adjustment necessary in public finances in order to prevent public debt from spiralling 
out of control, in the long term, when rising age-related expenditure is taken into account.
The MoF Economics Department’s assessment of the long-term sustainability of pub-
lic finances is based on EU harmonised methods and calculation rules. The assessment of 
age-related expenditure is based on a model developed by the Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Health for social expenditure analysis. The long-term background assumptions of the 
calculation (e.g. employment, productivity, interest rate and inflation) are based on those 
used in the 2015 report by the EU Economic Policy Committee’s Ageing Working Group1. 
1 The 2015 Ageing Report: Underlying Assumptions and Projection Methodologies, European Economy 
8/2014.
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According to the assumptions in this EU report, productivity in Finland will increase 
by an annual average of 1.4% in 2020–2060. The present assessment diverges from these 
assumptions in two respects: the forecasts for demographic trends are based instead on Sta-
tistics Finland’s 2015 population projection, and the 2016–2020 projections of economic 
development are based on the MoF Economic Department’s economic forecast and medium-
term calculations presented in this outlook. 
It is estimated that the sustainability gap will be just over 3% of GDP at 2020 level. This 
is slightly lower than the forecast presented last autumn. The sustainability gap estimate has 
been slightly increased as a result of factoring in the new population projection, but other 
factors have contributed to decrease it somewhat.
Both the autumn and the present sustainability gap estimate take into account the effects 
of the pension reform that will be implemented from the beginning of 2017: this will reduce 
the sustainability gap in public finances by around one percentage point. It is anticipated 
that the reform will both increase the employment rate and reduce pension expenditure. 
The calculation does not take into account the long-term actions presented in the Govern-
ment Programme for the improvement of public finances, such as the reform of social and 
health care services.
Table 28. General government finances 2015–2060, % of GDP
2015 2020 2030 2040 2060 2060-2015
% of GDP change, %
Total expenditure 58.3 56.4 60.3 61.2 66.0 7.7
of which age-related and unemployment ex-
penditure 30.0 30.5 31.6 31.3 31.8 1.7
Pensions 13.7 14.1 14.5 13.1 12.7 -1.0
Old-age pensions 12.4 13.0 13.5 12.2 11.7 -0.7
Other pensions 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 -0.2
Health care 5.9 6.1 6.5 6.8 7.2 1.3
Long-term care 2.2 2.3 2.9 3.6 4.0 1.8
Education 5.7 5.7 5.9 5.9 5.9 0.3
Unemployment 2.5 2.2 1.9 1.9 1.9 -0.6
Interest expenditure 1.2 1.1 3.9 5.0 9.4 8.3
Total revenue 55.5 55.0 56.4 55.3 54.7 -0.8
of which: property income 3.1 3.6 4.9 3.9 3.3 0.2
Net lending *) -2.7 -1.3 -3.9 -5.8 -11.3 -8.5
of which: transfer to pension funds 1.4 0.8 0.4 0.9 1.1 -0.3
General government debt 63.1 67.2 79.5 103.8 194.9 131.8
General government assets, consolidated 127.1 128.9 110.6 91.5 82.4 -44.7
Pension funds` financial assets, consolidated 85.8 87.6 76.1 63.0 61.4 -24.4
*) Cyclically-adjusted net lending as of 2020.
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Table 29. Underlying assumptions
Assumptions, %
2020 2030 2040 2060
Labour productivity growth 0.8 1.4 1.5 1.5
Real GDP growth 1.1 1.4 1.8 1.5
Participation rate
males (15-64 ) 77.0 77.5 77.3 77.7
females  (15-64) 75.1 74.9 75.3 76.2
total (15-64 ) 76.1 76.2 76.3 77.0
Unemployment rate 8.1 6.9 6.8 7.3
Old-age dependency ratio* 36.9 43.4 44.6 50.7
Inflation 1.8 2.0 2.0 2.0
Real interest rate 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Real return of asset 1.8 3.5 3.5 3.5
* the ratio of people aged over 64 to those aged 15–64
Souce: Ministry of Social Affairs, Statistics Finland, Ministry of Finance.
The sustainability calculation is effectively a pressure projection in which developments 
under current legislation and practices are projected to the future with the help of the popu-
lation projection, the breakdown of spending by age groups, and assessments of long-term 
economic development. The further one reaches ahead of time, the greater the uncertainty 
of the projection, which is why the projection is highly sensitive to the assumptions used. 
Sustainability gap calculations are nonetheless useful tools in providing a consistent way of 
analysing and overcoming the future challenges that lie ahead for public finances.
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Appendix
Supplementary statistics
1.  Evolution of forecasts over time
2.  Outturn data and forecasts used in budget process for 2011-2015, average change, %
3.  National balance of supply and demand
4.  Financial balance of the Finnish economy
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Table 2. Outturn data and forecasts used in budget process for 2011-2015
Years 2011-2015 Average forecast errors
Forecast 
averages, % ch.
Outcome 
averages, % ch.
Forecast 
under-/over-esti-
mation1, pp.
Magnitude of 
forecast error2, 
pp.
GDP (volume) 1.7 0.2 1.6 1.7
GDP (value) 3.9 2.3 1.7 2.1
Private consumption (value) 3.6 3.0 0.6 1.2
Current account, % of GDP 0.1 -1.0 1.1 1.7
Inflation 2.4 1.7 0.7 1.1
Wage bill 3.0 1.9 1.1 1.3
Unemployment rate 8.2 8.4 -0.2 0.6
Central government debt, % of GDP 46.7 45.0 1.7 1.7
Central government net lending, % of GDP -3.2 -3.5 0.3 0.8
General government net lending, % of GDP -1.6 -2.3 0.7 1.1
Forecasts are compared with March/July preliminary national accounts data. 
Averages for the past five years are calculated on the basis of spring and autumn forecasts concerning the budget year.
1 Over- or understimation is indicated by average forecast error. 2 The average of absolute error values indicates the average magnitude of forecast errors, 
regardless of the direction of error.
Table 1. Evolution of forecasts over time1)
2015 2016** 2017** 2018**
es2 es3 es4 es1 es2 es3 es4 es1 es2 es3 es4 es1 es1
GDP at market prices,  
change in volume, % 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 0.9 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.2 
Consumption, change in volume, % 0.9 0.8 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
Exports, change in volume, % 0.3 0.9 -1.1 0.6 3.3 3.0 1.8 1.3 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.9 3.6 
Unemployment rate, % 9.3 9.6 9.4 9.4 9.0 9.4 9.4 9.3 8.7 9.1 9.0 9.0 8.7 
Consumer price index, change, % 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.3 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.5 
Central government net lending, 
relative to GDP, % -3.1 -3.1 -3.1 -3.1 -2.6 -2.8 -2.9 -2.9 -2.5 -2.6 -2.7 -2.6 -2.2
General government net lending, 
relative to GDP, % -3.2 -3.4 -3.3 -2.7 -2.5 -2.8 -2.9 -2.5 -2.4 -2.4 -2.6 -2.1 -1.8
Central government debt,  
relative to GDP, % 48.7 48.7 48.5 48.2 49.8 49.9 49.9 50.0 50.8 51.2 51.3 51.6 52.4
1)  Economic Survey / release date: 17.6.2015 (es2), 28.9.2015 (es3), 18.12.2015 (es4) and 14.4.2016 (es1)
Sources: Statistics Finland, MoF 
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Table 3. National balance of supply and demand, EUR million
Current prices
2013 2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018**
GDP at market prices 203 339 205 268 207 220 210 587 215 382 221 085 
Imports of goods and services 80 724 79 462 76 627 77 677 80 898 84 921 
Total supply 284 063 284 730 283 847 288 264 296 280 306 006 
Exports of goods and services 78 924 77 600 77 284 78 009 81 183 85 260 
Consumption 161 588 164 471 166 507 168 472 171 545 175 313 
private 111 277 113 690 115 592 116 912 119 159 121 911 
public 50 311 50 781 50 915 51 560 52 386 53 401 
Investment 43 083 42 197 42 115 44 981 47 512 50 068 
private 34 643 33 729 33 790 36 358 38 700 41 205 
public 8 440 8 468 8 325 8 622 8 813 8 863 
Total demand 284 062 285 753 284 568 288 985 297 001 306 727 
At reference year 2010 prices; not additive
2013 2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018**
GDP at market prices 187 739 186 427 187 445 189 166 191 369 193 724 
Imports of goods and services 75 779 75 795 75 507 77 455 79 742 82 518 
Total supply 263 518 262 222 262 952 266 621 271 110 276 242 
Exports of goods and services 75 554 74 883 75 310 76 289 78 495 81 345 
Consumption 147 723 148 170 149 251 150 247 151 134 152 105 
private 102 348 102 925 104 406 105 448 106 334 107 318 
public 45 364 45 239 44 851 44 813 44 825 44 824 
Investment 39 718 38 676 38 264 40 244 41 581 42 821 
private 31 985 30 984 30 662 32 439 33 767 35 101 
public 7 728 7 685 7 596 7 798 7 803 7 704 
Total demand 263 383 263 046 262 050 264 150 267 026 270 503 
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Table 4. Financial balance of the Finnish economy
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
relative to GDP, %
Gross investment 22.2 22.3 21.2 20.6 20.3
households and  non-profit institutions 6.6 6.5 6.2 5.8 5.7
non-financial corporations and  
financial and insurance corporations 11.9 11.8 10.8 10.6 10.6
general government 3.8 4.0 4.2 4.1 4.0
Gross saving 1 22.1 20.7 19.7 19.7 19.5
households and  non-profit institutions 4.7 4.5 5.0 4.2 3.8
non-financial corporations and  
financial and insurance corporations 14.7 14.3 13.2 14.6 14.5
general government 2.8 1.9 1.5 0.9 1.2
Financial surplus -1.3 -1.8 -1.7 -1.6 -0.1
households and  non-profit institutions -2.1 -2.3 -1.5 -1.8 -2.0
non-financial corporations and  
financial and insurance corporations 1.8 2.6 2.3 3.4 4.6
general government -1.0 -2.1 -2.6 -3.2 -2.7
Statistical discrepancy 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.5 -0.3
1  Incl. capital transfers (net)
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